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SLEEPING ON THE JOB: THE IRISH FAILURE
TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF NICE

MArrHEwC JENNEJOHN

The fondamental misperception among the central decision-making group prevented the Irish government from
appropriately counteracting the Nice opposition campaign. Government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality are the key foctors contributing to the administration's misestimation of both the opposition and
its own efficacy. The results not only explain a watershed event in EU development but also prescribe specific policy principles ofEU enlargement to continue. Special emphasis is placed on the study's ramifications for the intergovernmental model for EU policy-making. The writer wishes to thank Dr. Valerie Hudson and Dr. Wilde Jacoby
of Brigham Young University and Dr. Michael Young of Ohio State University for their contributions to
this article.
SLEEPING THROUGH THE "CHOICE
FOR EUROPE"

It was a very quiet day yesterday for the 14 people

sitting behind polling tables in Neilstown National
School, Co Dublin. By 5:20 p.m. just 5.4 per cent
of the 4,350 voters had dropped by. Polling officers
looked bored, having lost interest hours earlier in
the books they brought, or the small talk their tablepartner had to offer. Well-used word puzzle books
lay around. And the electorate [was] just as bored.
(Ni Cheallaigh, 2001)

Upon the close of the lackadaisical Irish
polls on 7 June 2001, I all of the late-night
bickering among European Union (EU) members at Nice the previous December suddenly
appeared in vain. With 54% of voters refusing to
ratifY the Treaty of Nice, the Irish electorate
aborted the institutional reforms codified within
the Treaty that are necessary for the European

Union's expansion into Central and Eastern
Europe. 2 The Treaty implements controversial
and painful reforms in Union decision-making
and budget policy in order to accommodate an
expansion that adds twelve governments to the
administrative structure, increases EU population by over 25%, and yet only augments EU
GDP by 5%.\ The Treaty's implementation is
the last step in a decade-long process to fully
integrate the former communist countries into
a democratic Europe. However, by halting the
requisite reforms, the Irish referendum jeopardized this historic EU expansion if not frustrated
it all together (Kaminski 2001).

WHY?
Perplexity crept through the whole of
Europe and, ironically, through the administration of Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern following the referendum. Why did the Irish,
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having ratified the previous treaty on European
enlargement (the Treaty of Amsterdam) in 1998,
refuse the Treaty of Nice in 2001? This question
is especially puzzling considering Ireland's historically supportive electorate and foreign policy
behavior.4 While the role of the "No to Nice"
opposition campaign is clear in the Treaty rejection, the source of its efficacy is not. How could
an opposition campaign orchestrated by electoral
starvelings wrest victory from the hands of the
entire Irish political center?1 Why did the Nice
supporters, most notably the government, run
such an ineffective, half-hearted campaign for
Nice ratification? Lastly, both participants and
observers asked the most crucial of all: So what
happens now?
In hopes of eventually approaching this last
question, this case study begins by tackling the
first: Why did the Irish, having ratified the Treaty
of Amsterdam in 1998, reverse their EU policy
and refuse the Treaty of Nice in 2001? As we shall
see, changes occurring between 1998 and 2001
among those parties opposing EU expansion
account for the Irish policy reversal. However,
although the opposition parties were galvanized
by 2001, these changes still do not explain how a
coalition of parties controlling no more than 5%
to 7% of the electorate was able to undermine
the will of Ireland's major center parties." Thus,
understanding the Nice "yes" campaign is this
study's central puzzle: if they were committed to
the Treaty's ratification and also had the ability
to appropriately counteract the opposition, why
did the Nice supporters run such an impotent
campaignrWhy were they caught sleeping?
Two SFDATIVES AND A TRFACHFROUS PERsoNALITY

I argue that a conflation of governmental,
cultural, and personality factors caused the
Ahern administration to misestimate both its
opponents' and its own efficacy. While the fundamental source of the administration's misperception is found in Ahern's own personality,
government structure and cultural preferences
provided the conditions (the "sedatives") necessary for Ahern's personality to be influential.
Because of his misestimation, Ahern failed to
muster a sufficient counterattack against the Nice
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referendum opposition, thus allowing the "no"
campaign to seize victory.
This rather holistic argument takes issue
with the conventional wisdom regarding the
poorly executed "yes" campaign. Typical explanations of "yes" impotency claim that considerations
for the upcoming 2002 elections prevented Nice
supporters from spending sufficient campaign
funds to win ratification: "Facing the prospect of
an election in 200112002, the political parties
were loath to use scarce financial resources on the
Nice campaign as there is no state funding of
political parties in Ireland" (Laffan 2001, 2).
I find such explanations wanting in three respects.
First, the Nice opposition parties must also
budget for the 2002 elections-why could they
afford to break the bank over Nice while the
flush center parties could not? Second, successfully campaigning for Nice arguably does not
require much money: with 59% of the population supporting enlargement (Special 2001) and
over 50% of the population attributing their
decision not to vote simply to their inability to
understand the Treaty's intent and content (Peel
2001), successful ratification demands no more
money than what is needed to translate clearly
the purpose of the Treaty to the public. Since the
"no" campaign communicated their translation
of the Treaty primarily through posters and
television/radio invites (to which the "yes" campaigners were invited also), it follows that successful campaigning was possible for a minimal
price." Third, for no cost to the "yes" campaign,
other EU members campaigned among the Irish
voters to ratify the treaty (e.g., Germany's
Joschka Fischer gave rallies in Dublin urging
ratification) (de Breadun and Staunton 2001).
Yet, outside contributions still didn't turn the
tide of favor. "The 'no' campaign won the battle
of language" (Laffan 2001, 3), not the battle of
the war chest. Thus, the "yes" campaign suffered
less for a lack of funds than for a lack of vision
(Holland 2001 and Laffan 2001, 3).

So WHAT?
This article makes three contributions to
foreign policy-making and political analysis.
First, this explanation might grant policy-makers
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critical insight into gaining public support for
pro-EU legislation in an increasingly technical
and "democratically deficient" European Union.
Second, this study provides an explanation for a
watershed event in EU history-obviously, if we
understand why the Irish rejected Nice, we
might determine whether this obstacle to EU
enlargement is surmountable or not. Third, this
study introduces an important caveat to liberal
intergovernmentalism's model of EU policymaking:' The Irish case shows that understanding the impact of government structure, cultural
preferences, and personality allows us to better
apply the intergovernmentalist model to policy
scenarios. Hence, the relevance of this study is
founded upon both practical and theoretical
applications. Considering the unprecedented
crossroads at which the EU now stands-the
common currency came into full effect at
the beginning of the year, a common defense
force will soon be a functioning reality, the
Union is set to nearly double its size to 27 members within 10 years, and institutional reforms
are, arguably, creating a more federalist future for
Europe-these contributions to understanding
current and future European political phenomena are valuable indeed.
After introducing Irish domestic politics
and outlining how the Nice opposition managed
to deny the EU of ratification, I will present the
three major factors contributing to the Ahern
administration's mistake. First, I will discuss the
impact of government structure upon the administration's decision-making. Second, I will
treat the role of Irish culture in the administration's decision-making. As will be shown, these
two factors funnel decision-making power away
from organizational and bureaucratic processes
to the taoiseach (the Irish word for Prime Minister) himself Thus, the third major factor contributing to the Irish government's misestimation
of the Nice situation is the personality and perception of Bertie Ahern himself

produced a robust anti-enlargement campaign in
2001. The nature of the Irish political system
provides the motivation and means for opposition movements, such as "No to Nice," to
emerge. With the necessary systemic condition
provided, changes in the opposition party fortunes between 1998 and 2001 allowed these
parties to take advantage of the opportunity Nice
offered.
Means and Motive. For the focus of this
article, the ramifications of proportional representation and coalition government are the most
important aspects of Irish politics to be considered. While a full description of the unique Irish
proportional voting scheme will be provided
later, it suffices now to simply point out that proportional representation (PR), unlike a majoritarian system, allows for small party existence.
Additionally, coalition government provides
small parties an access to power; a major party
often needs only a small party to create a governing coalition. For instance, under Ahern,
Fianna Fail joined with the Progressive Democrats (a smaller party harvesting only 8% of the
vote on average) to form the current coalition.
PR and coalition government, thus, grant small
parties both the means and the motives for
"rocking the boat" in hopes of gaining an inroad
to governance.
The Nice Treaty referendum provided such
an inroad for two of Ireland's smallest, though
increasingly potent, parties: Sinn Fein and the
Green Party. Looking for an opportunity to legitimize their participation in the mainstream political debates (Financial Times 2001), these
opposition parties found Nice an ideal sticking
point. In the words of one Sinn Fein committee
member, "It's given us new credibility. People are
beginning to think that if there were more Sinn
Fein TDs and they played a bigger role, then
what would that role be? It is an excellent chance
for us to explain" (ibid.).10 An exchange between
Ahern and Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader,
illustrates the same opportunism:

IRISH DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING NICE
RATIFICATION: AHERN'S RUDE AWAKENING

The Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, met the Sinn Fein presi-

Irish domestic politics and internal changes
within the parties opposing the Nice Treaty

him why the parry was urging a "No" vote. Shrug-

dent, Mr. Adams, early in the campaign and asked
ging his shoulders on the staircase of Government

SIGMA·

9

TREATY OF NICE
Buildings, Mr. Adams looked up and smiled: "Can
you think of a better way of getting publicity?" (Ibid)

Thus, the Nice referendum offered these parties
a cheap and effective means of getting a foot in
the door before the next round of elections.
Internal Galvanization. Changes in the
opposition parties' respective political situations
also account for the Irish policy reversal between
Amsterdam and Nice. 11 Until the Good Friday
Agreement of 1999, Sinn Fein was still enmeshed with an armed and mobilized IRA.
Competing in the typical debates and machinations of a liberal democracy (e.g., arguing against
Nice to boost electoral prospects) was out of
question for a Sinn Fein that was still directly
associated with terrorism. Once the Good Friday
Agreement passed, however, Sinn Fein was freer
to reconstruct a new image for itself The other
major opposition party, the Greens, didn't factor
into the Amsterdam decision simply because
they didn't exist in any significant numbers at the
time (the Greens were first established in Ireland
around 1996). After three years of consolidating
support on campuses and organizing among the
electorate, the Green Party finally had the political clout (and it was still little at that) to affect
major national debates. Therefore, with both
major opposition parties unable to mount an
attack on EU enlargement in 1997-98, ratification of Amsterdam proved an easy measure. The
parties' different political fortunes three years
later made Nice ratification more uncertain.
Thus, the power of domestic politics is evident in the Irish case. By failing to appropriately
manage the domestic game, to use Putnam's
metaphor (1988), the Irish decision-makers
allowed themselves to be acted upon. The opposition parties had their victory, Ahern had the
proverbial foot in mouth, and the EU still didn't
have a binding treaty. Why did Ahern fail to
oppose "No to Nice"?
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: SEDATIVE ONE

Ireland employs a unique "proportional
representation-single transferable vote" system (PR-STY or simply STY).12 This peculiar
electoral scheme, along with the institutional
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character it gives the Irish government, provides
the fundamental environment necessary for
personality and perception, the most defining
characteristics of Irish decision-making, to affect
government foreign policy. The structure of the
Irish government subtly yet powerfully impacts
Irish foreign policy decision-making. Specifically,
the PR-STY scheme, in cultivating personality
politics, magnifies the depth of personality's effect
on policy-making, while the method of cabinet
formation and functioning, in allowing much
leadership autonomy, compounds the breadth of
personality's effect on policy-making.
The Effects of PR-STV. While the PR
nature of the system creates the sufficient conditions for multiple parties and thus coalition government, the single transferable vote option, by
allowing voters to put down their second and
third preferences should their first option lose,
fosters constituency politics. STY provides the
Irish voter with the opportunity to compare
competing candidates on individual rather than
party criteria and forces the Irish politician to
engage his/her constituency on a personal level;
the high level of proportionality reinforces the
importance of constituency politics in Ireland.
The intimacy between candidate and voter in
constituent politics, often founded upon a perception of friendship, establishes the primacy of
personality considerations in electing officials.
In that "ranking a set of candidates according to one's preferences" (Sinnott 1995, 104-5)
is the central logic of the STY vote scheme, a
candidate's image compared to his/her competitors' assumes paramount importance. Were Ireland to use the list scheme like other PR regimes,
where voters simply vote for a comprehensive
party ticket rather than for individual candidates, party loyalties would trump individual
candidates' characteristics. The party would
overshadow and subsume the unique character,
promises, plans, and ideologies of the individual
candidates. However, by not using such a list system, the Irish Constitution provides for the separate consideration of each candidate.
While not using a list scheme provides for
individual candidate relevance and introduces
candidate comparison to Irish voting, STY further magnifies the importance of comparative
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differences. Unlike majority/plurality systems
(e.g., the United Kingdom or the United States),
where the crucial battles are fought among the
"swing voters," the STV system forces politicians
to campaign equally among all constituents.
While swaying the fence sitters is still important,
it is also important for a politician to campaign
among his/her opponents' core supporters since
they may make him/her their second preference.
To illustrate the relevance of second and third
preferences, the results of the 1990 Irish Presidential election are provided below: l'
<-undidute

First

iramjer oj

Second C ount

l'refCrences

Curries Votes

Result

Austin

267,902

-267,902

Lenihan, Brian

694,484

~urrie,

+36,789

731,273

Robinson, Mary 612,265

+205,565

817,830

Non trmsferable

+25,548

25,548

papers
Valid votes: 1,574,651. Quota: 787,326

Figure 1. Results of the 1990 Irish Presidential election

Were it not for the second preference votes
transferred from Austin Currie to Mary Robinson (votes are transferred when none of the candidates reach the election quota upon the first
count), Brian Lenihan would have won the Presidency. The second preference votes were so crucial that, had she not campaigned among
Currie's supporters, Robinson would have lost
the Presidency. Thus, with a nonlist voting
scheme and the need to campaign among all
district voters, a broad relationship is forged
between politicians and citizens.
The Irish constitution's limits on district
SIze deepen the already broad politiClanconstituent relationship provided by STY.
District size must be no larger than 30,000 constituents per parliament member and no smaller
than 20,000 per member (Chubb 1992, 134).
Historically, district SIze has hovered around
21,000 constituents ever since the advent of the
republic in the early 1920s (ibid.). The expectations of the Irish voters further deepen this relationship. A poll conducted in 1989 measunng
"the most important criterion determining [the
Irish voters] vote" found "choosing a [parliament
member] who will look after the local needs of

the constituency" to be by far the most critical
consideration for the Irish voter, with 40% of the
participants placing it first (Chubb 1992, 144).
"Choosing a taoiseach," "choosing ministers who
will form a government," and "choosing a [parliament member] who will perform well on
national issues in the [Parliament)" were placed
as first considerations by only 14%, 9%, and
15% of the poll participants respectively (ibid.).
Thus, small districts allow for close politicianconstituent contact, while voter expectations
demand it.
Proportionality/disproportionality is "measured by comparing parties' shares of the votes
with their shares of the seats and noting the discrepancies" (Sinnott 1999, 113). "PR-STV in
Ireland delivers a high degree of proportionality,
virtually as high as that produced by electoral
systems that have the achievement of proportionality as their sole aim" (Sinnott 1995, 115).
As a practical matter for the Irish politician, high
proportionality means that voters' preferences
are efficiently translated in elections. Subsequently, the politician must actively maintain the
broad, deep relationship created by PR-STV or
else face negative results from a disenchanted
electorate.
The primacy of personality, caused by the
nature of STY, small districts, voter expectations,
and high proportionality combine to make the
personality and perception of the taoiseach
the most important influences on Irish foreign
policy decision-making. The relative power and
autonomy of the office of taoiseach make this
combination possible.

The Efficts of Irish Cabinet Formation/
Functioning. While coalition government often
disperses decision-making power among many, it
provides no such service in Ahern's administration. The insignificant number of Progressive
Democrats serving in ministerial posts (only one
Minister and two Deputy-Ministers) allows for
Fianna Fiil domination in group deliberation.
With the central decision-making group ideologically homogenous, the necessary conditions
for "groupthink" exist within the Irish cabinet
(Janis 1982, 174). Thus, Irish government structure provides the Prime Minister with a large
amount of autonomy. Also, as will be discussed
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later, certain cultural preferences predispose the
Irish to groupthink situations. With groupthink
"pressures toward uniformity" (Janis 1982,
175) silencing possible detractors to the
taoiseach's policy-preferences, the taoiseach's
personality and perceptions enjoy a wide range
of influence.
The Prime Minister's autonomy allows
him/her to transcend the group in making decisions. "The taoiseach is usually considered to be
one of the strongest of all heads of government"
(Elgie 1999, 237). The norms of Irish cabinet
interplay provide the taoiseach with most of this
decision-making power: "The taoiseach determines the order in which items on the cabinet
agenda are taken, the time given to consideration
of each item, who is to speak, and when a decision should be reached-or postponed.... In
practice, ministers do not challenge the
taoiseach's control of the agenda" (Farrell 1971,
176). In addition to agenda control, the
taoiseach enjoys pervasive influence in the entire
decision-making process:- "the Taoiseach is in a
position to direct rather than simply manage the
flow of governmental business and is thus able to
follow the full course of policy making from
inception through to approval at the cabinet
level" (Elgie 1999, 239). Thus, institutional
norms allow the taoiseach considerable autonomy in the decision-making process; if he/she
desires to, the taoiseach may transcend the Cabinet and make unilateral decisions.
The tao is each's previous experience in government grants him/her the ability to take
advantage of these norms and transcend his cabinet as such. History bears out that prime ministers typically have extensive experience in
previous governments. For instance, Bertie
Ahern, previous to his tenure as Prime Minister,
served as the Assistant Government Whip, Chief
Government Whip, Minister for Labour, and
Finance Minister. Therefore, Ahern, serving in
several previous governments, has necessary acumen to forsake consulting his Cabinet on crucial
decisions.
With institutionally granted autonomy
and the ability or power to take advantage of that
autonomy, the Prime Minister is the key, almost
sole, decision-maker in Irish foreign policy. We
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may look at these two factors as the necessary
conditions for taoiseach personality and perception to significantly influence foreign policy. If
those are the necessary conditions, then the pervasiveness of personality politics, as described
earlier, provides the sufficient condition. The
primacy of personality created by the small districts' constituency politics does not dwindle
with becoming Prime Minister: first, as mentioned before, no real structures exist to constrain elite personality; and second, the Prime
Minister, as a continuing member of Parliament,
is still beholden to his district constituency.
Thus, we would expect that any irrational outcomes in Irish foreign policy decision-making
could most probably be explained by the unique
personality and perceptions of the Irish Prime
Minister.
CULTURE: SEDATIVE

Two

Culture has a glacial influence on foreign
policy decision-making; its effect on the political
environment is deep and lasting. However, inasmuch as it carves out the canyons and moraines
of the national psyche over a long period of time
and over a broad horizon, culture's influence is
difficult to pinpoint. As Vertzberger points out,
"societal factors are less apparent to the observer"
(Vertzberger 1991, 260). In the Irish case at least,
culture does not explicitly cause, per se, any foreign policy outcomes. However, like Ireland's
governmental structure, Ireland's culture contributes to isolating decision-making power in
the hands of the taoiseach.
In identifYing causality, following Hudson's
prescription for examining cultural "value preferences" (Hudson 1997, 8-9), I will employ
Vertzberger's theoretical framework for culturedecision interaction. Vertzberger outlines four
ways that culture (or "societal attributes") affects
leaders' decision-making:
First, [societal attributes] affect the weight attached
to foreign policy issues compared to other issues on

the decision-makers' agenda and hence affect the
allocation of attention to and cognizance of foreignpolicy-related information. Second, once information has been recognized and has gained attention,
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societal factors may impinge on the assessment of the
importance of a particular datum and its diagnostic
value. Third, societal attributes may influence the
open-mindedness of decision-makers to dissonant
information and their preparedness to readjust existing definitions of the situation in the light of
new information. Finally, their attributes affect the
interpretation of available information and the
choice among competing interpretations. (1991,
261)

In other words, culture can affect policy by
influencing decision-makers' priorities, by favoring particular sets of data, by further dosing or
opening decision-makers' minds, and by biasing
certain interpretations at the expense of others. I
will discuss the special importance of culture
affecting policy in Vertzberger's ways one and
four. Culture affects the Irish decision on
enlargement the most by influencing decisionmaker priorities and by biasing decision-makers'
interpretations.
Hofstede identifies four cultural preference
continua influential to foreign policy decisionmaking: one, individualism v. collectivism; two,
strong v. weak gender differentiation; three,
small v. large power distances; and four, low v.
high uncertainty avoidance. I; Like values, preferences also provide a framework for decisionmaking. The natural preferences of a culture
predispose decision-makers to particular types of
action. For example, as Hofstede notes, cultures
that prefer individualism to collectivism value
personal achievement more than group harmony. These preferences affect decision-making
by prescribing certain action. For instance, the
subordination of group harmony to individual
achievement invites debate into decisionmaking, thus undermining one of the causes of
groupthink (Janis 1982, 37-9). The particular
preferences of Irish culture hampered the
Administration's ability to counter "No to Nice"
because they fostered groupthink.
Irish culture, generally speaking, lends decision-makers to prefer collectivism to individualism, weak gender differentiation, and small power
distance. I) The Irish preference for collectivism is
evidenced in the importance of relationships
among Irish politicians'" (for instance, Ahern's

chief Cabinet Members and political counselors
are his boyhood friends), the resolution of conflict
through bargaining (such as, leadership successions in the Fianna Fail party involve negotiations
between the party elite), and the familial relationships between superordinates and subordinates in
Irish politics (e.g., Charles Haughey, former
Prime Minister and Bertie Ahern's political mentor, aided Ahern throughout his career after meeting fourteen-year-old Ahern at a local canvassing
board). Irish decision-makers also prefer a weak
gender differentiation: for example, the two
Presidents of the 1990s were women and recent
legislation modernized Irish gender law (Finnegan
and McCarron 2000, 183-8). Also, Irish culture
prefers a small power distance of which the following organizational chart provides an example l7
(notice the lack of extensive hierarchy-e.g., the
Prime Minister's office is organized not above
the other Ministries but as just another cog in the
government's wheel):

He.dh

El'lerq

C'efe:l)se

Justice

EducatIOn

Labor

En . . lfon,

FOIl!lqr"!

p. 24 Barrington 1980
Figure 2. Irish executive branch organizational chart

The cultural preferences of Ireland identified using Hofstede's criteria contribute to the
Administration's failure to meet the opposition's
threat. The preferences for collectivism, weak
gender differentiation, and small power distance,
provide an ideal groupthink 18 environment by
lending the Irish decision-makers to seek consensus, resolve conflict while retaining group
harmony, and maintain low levels of centralization. With group members prizing relationships
over tasks and group harmony over dissention,
the autonomous taoiseach enjoys almost total
group loyalty in making a decision. Therefore,
when Ahern made the decision to disregard the
"No to Nice" campaign, other Cabinet Members
felt comfortable with simply jumping on the
bandwagon.
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ET TO BERTIE? AHERN
AS HIS

OwN WORST ENEMY

With government sttucture and culture
funneling decision-making power almost
entirely into the taoiseach, the unique personality and perceptions of Bertie Ahern determined
the Administration's approach to the Nice opposition. As outlined above, the structure of the
Irish Execurive and the nature of Irish constituent politics allow for the individual leader's
personality and perceptions to playa significant
role. Cultural preferences incubated the central
decision-making group in a groupthink environment-those that might have raised alternative
policies deferred to the taoiseach. Both his personality trait of confidence and his perception of
the opposition's strength factored heavily into
Ahern's decision-making regarding the Nice
"yes" campaign. 19
I argue that Ahern was aware of the growth
in opposition from Amsterdam to Nice but had
an attitude that undercut an appropriate counter
attack. That Ahern recognized the strength of
the opposition is reflected in comments such as
"[the previous referendums on the EU] all passed
comfortably, even if the margin of success had
been gradually declining" (Ahern 2000). Ahern
was aware of the growing opposition to EU
enlargement. Also, with the major parties outlining their stances on the Nice Treaty months
before the referendum in June, it would have
been nearly impossible for an astute politician to
fail to recognize the existence of an opposition.
Ahern's attitude affected decision-making
in two respects. First, Ahern's attitude led him to
be overconfident in the situation and abilities of
his administration. Second, Ahern's attitude led
him to misperceive the abilities of his opposition. Thus, Ahern's attitude squandered any
value brought by recognizing opposition growth
after Amsterdam. In the words of Brigid Laffan,
"The performance of the Government was particularly lacklustre as it appeared to take the outcome for granted" (Laffan 2001, 3).
A content analysis of speeches given by
Ahern from the beginning of 1999 to July 2001
reveals Ahern's steadily swelling self-confidence. I
followed a simple three-step process in measuring
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Ahern's confidence levels. First, I coded his
speeches for confidence, following coding and
content analysis methods developed by Margaret
Hermann. 2o Second, I coded the same speeches
for a lack of confidence using the same principles. I operationalized a lack of confidence
as use of the subjunctive verbal mood in nonconditional statements and use of plural firstperso~ personal pronouns when the actor is
discussing initiating action, his/her position of
authority, and receiving positive feedback. 2 1 The
third and final step was dividing each speech's
high confidence measure by its low confidence measure. This creates a ratio of high confidence to low confidence that captures the
highllow relationship.
My analysis reveals high confidence markers increasing more than low confidence markers
until the Nice referendum. Low confidence markers quickly outnumber high confidence markers
shortly thereafter. While content analysis is not a
perfect science, I am confident this measure is
roughly accurate of Ahern's confidence during this
period: the four speeches and one interview coded
were each well over 1,000 words, thus providing
sufficient material for an accurate coding.
As the graph below shows, confidence
reached its peak during the months immediately
preceding the Nice referendum debacle (and fell
thereafter):
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Figure 3. Measure of Ahern's confidence levels from early
1999

to

mid-2001

Previous victories in subjects unrelated to
the EU caused Ahern to overestimate his odds of
success on the Nice referendum. In the early part
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of 1999, Ahern was still weathering criticism and
grappling with persistent opposition regarding the
Good Friday Agreement-thus the relatively low
confidence levels. Upon final resolution of this
issue, a major victory for Ahern and his administration, Ahern's confidence steadily grew. In the
sense that Ahern's growing confidence can be
attributed to his watershed victory in the Northern Ireland peace process, and as such the result of
a "judgmental-evaluative process" (Vertzberger
1990, 128), Ahern's confidence can be categorized
within Vertzberger's definition of an attitude. The
relationship between the attitude of confidence
and the decision to not counteract the Nice opposition is causal: "[attitudes] create a disposition for
a particular pattern of behavior toward specific
objects or categories of objects and social situations or some combinations thereof' (Vertzberger
1990, 127-8). Thus, Ahern's confident attitude
prevented him from appropriately reacting to his
opposition. He misperceived his own efficacy and,
therefore, didn't take the proper steps to shore up
the support for Nice.
In Ahern's case, the sword cut twice. Not
only did Ahern overestimate his own position
but he also underestimated the position of his
opponents. Vertzberger describes the "insensitiviry to situational implications" evident in Ahern's
disregard for the Nice opposition as "the tendency to prefer dispositional explanations of the
other actors' behavior" (e.g., inherent weakness)
(Vertzberger 1990, 129). In other words, individuals choose to discount another actor on the
perception of the other's deficiency. As in
Vertzberger's example of Israel disregarding the
obviously imminent attack from the "weaker"
Arab states in the fall of 1973, Ahern and his
administration underestimated the opposition
because they considered their opponents as ideologically marginalized, intellectually inferior,
immoral, and illegitimate.
Statements from administration officials
indicate these four sources of "situational insensitivity." Ahern's Minister of Justice reveals the
perception of the opposition as intellectually
inferior and ideologically marginalized when
referring to the Green Party with the following,
"What can be said of this party whose policies
and attitudes regularly make good theatre of the

absurd?" (Irish Times 2001b) Perceived opposition immorality and illegitimacy is evidenced
through another administration official who
"described the No [to Nice] campaign as
'wrong'" (Irish Times 2001 b), and through the
Minister of the Environment who said that
the Sinn Fein "campaign was dishonest" (Irish
Times 2001a). Ahern himself referred to "No to
Nice" as "a sinister campaign of disinformation"
and called supporters of the "No" campaign the
"lunatic fringe" (de Breadun 2001). Thus, working within an attitude that perceived nonexistent
deficiencies in the opposition, Ahern and his
administration acted inappropriately to the reality they faced.
With Irish government structure and
culture concentrating the responsibility for
counter-acting the "No to Nice" campaign
in his hands, Bertie Ahern had only himself to
blame for the failure of Nice ratification. By
overestimating the efficacy of his administration
and underestimating the efficacy of his opposition, Ahern became his own worst enemy. In his
own words:
1, of course, am deeply disappointed by the Referen-

dum result. I am also disappointed that all of us on
the 'Yes' side, the Government, the main political
parties and the social partners were not able

to

per-

suade a higher number of voters to participate in
making such an important decision. (Ahern 2001)
RECAPITUlATION AND REFLECTION

The interplay of government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality provides the necessary and sufficient conditions
for decision-maker misperception in the Irish
case. Irish government structure and culture
concentrate decision-making authority in the
taoiseach by creating a group think environment
within the central decision-making body.
Although there are short power-distances and
little hierarchy in the Irish Cabinet, "pressures
towards uniformity" and institutional norms
grant the taoiseach sweeping autonomy. Irish
government structure and culture also elevate the
importance of personality in politics. Therefore,
the taoiseach has a proclivity for injecting his/her
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personality in politics, and his/her policy-making
autonomy provides the opportunity to do so.
Such personality injection is the precise
cause of the Administration's miscalculation
regarding the Nice referendum. Ahern's overconfidence in his own abilities and inaccurate attitudes
towards the Nice opposition led him to misperceive the situation. Without decision-making
power dispersed to other actors, that they might
challenge Ahern's interpretation and attendant
policy-prescription, this personal miscalculation
proved fatal to all on the "yes" side. Ahern had
both the ability and interest to defeat the "No to
Nice" campaign, but instead he inadvertently
allowed his opponents' victory.
The lessons provided by the Irish Nice
experience, especially when coupled with the
Danish Maastricht experience, are this article's
first intended contribution to the field. The Nice
experience shows that EU leaders cannot expect
to operate in a vacuum-if decision-makers neglect domestic interests, citizenries will impact EU
progress. Perhaps Nice's most important lesson is
that the "democratic deficit"22 murmured of for
so long is a reality, or at least perceived to be
among the electorate. EU policy-makers might
learn from Ireland that EU progress is feasible
not simply through direct, clear engagement
with the citizenry but also engagement that communicates interests up the hierarchy and not just
down. Vision, not just mud-slinging the opposition, must attend reform campaigns, especially
when the reforms do not promise more money.
Actor misperception, magnified by structural and cultural factors, provides my Nice
reversal explanation: my second intended contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis and
international political study. With this explanation, it is possible to discern whether this obstacle to EU enlargement is surmountable. My
explanation isn't a quick-fix like the "lack of
funds" explanation: simply throwing money at
this problem will not necessarily result in ratification. Yet, this explanation does allow for "yes"
correction. The Irish hurdle to enlargement is
surmountable, if the decision-making group,
principally Bertie Ahern, is able to correct the
previous misperception. Since failure is the primary impetus for change (Herman 1990, 10), it
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seems that this misperception, and thus Nice
ratification, will be corrected in time.
Third, this study contributes to European
political analysis, specifically to liberal intergovernmental theory. The politics of the Irish
Nice referendum provide an ideal case for further
understanding how states debate and configure
"national preferences," (Moravcsik 1993, 482,
and Moravcsik 1998, 24-7). National preference
formation is the first step in the intergovernmental model of EU negotiation and policymaking. Thus, the Irish experience allows us to
better understand and predict EU policy-making
by providing insight into this fundamental
process.
Arguing that "groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them"(Moravcsik
1993,483), liberal intergovernmentalism identifies the formation of national preferences as the
launchpad for EU policy outcomes. National
preferences are crucial because nation-state governments, not supranational bureaucrats, are the
key decision-makers in EU policy-making. 21
Andrew Moravcsik, the leading intergovernmental theorist, outlines the intergovernmental
policy-making model as follows: 2 ;

Liberal Theories
(International demand for
outcomes)
Underlying societal fuaors:
pressure from domestic societal
actors as represented in political
instirutions

.-

t

CONFIGURATION
OF STATE
PREFERENCES

t

Intergovernmental
Theories
(International supply of
outcomes)
Underlying political fuaors:
intensity of national preferences; alternative coalitions;
available issue lin~oes

NATIONAL
PREFERENCE
FORMATION

.-

INTERSTATE
NEGOTIATION

t

OUTCOMES

The Irish Nice referendum experience falls
within the "configuration of state preferences"
step of the model, where domestic and elite
preferences mix. Moravcsik argues that the
principle-agent relationship between society and
govern- ment bounds this preference configuration (Moravcsik 1993, 483). Since "the primary interest of governments is to maintain
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themselves in office" and since "this requires the
support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties,
interest groups, and bureaucracies" (Moravcsik
1993.483), preference configuration is rational.
Domestic actors directly or indirectly pressure
the government for a certain foreign policy decision (e.g., refuse to ratify the Nice Treaty).25 The
government must respond to domestic pressure
in order to secure their office. "At times the
principal-agent relationship between social pressures and state policies is tight; at times, 'agency
slack' in the relationship permits rational governments to exercise greater policy discretion"
(Moravcsik 1993, 484), depending upon the
issues and actors involved.
The Irish Nice experience teaches us that
decision-maker perception of this principal-agent
relationship is crucial for determining the outcome ofEU policy. In its Nice policy, the Administration perceived more slack in the relationship
than actually existed. The government inaccurately aggregated the domestic interests and configured a national preference unacceptable to the
domestic polity. Domestic actors took two routes
to influence this unacceptable configuration:
some directly protested, or exercised "voice," and
voted against the ratifying referendum, others
indirectly influenced, exercising "exit," and simply refused to participate. 26 The policy-making
process broke down because one of the players
inadvertently failed to follow the rules.
The Nice referendum offers an obvious
caveat to Moravcsik's model: rational assumptions explain the configuration of state preferences only if state decision-makers do not
seriously misperceive the principal-agent relationship. However, the Irish lesson goes further,
and is therefore more meaningful, by offering
the key variables explaining this misperception.
By analyzing the impact of government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality in a given case, we can determine whether
this misperception exists.
Understanding this preference configuration process allows policy-makers to manage
more effectively and efficiently the changes EU
enlargement requires. Such management is not
only necessary in Ireland but also in all of the current transfer states. With the accession of the

Central and Eastern European countries, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece will lose the majority of
their EU transfer funds along with Ireland
(Economist 2001). While Irish economic growth
has lessened the importance of the funds to the
Irish, the rest of the "Poor Four" still rely heavily
on transfers. Spain provides a striking example.
Transfers to Spain in 1997 totaled 2,674.1 million Spanish pesetas (Scobie 1998, 37-8) or
35.94 million U.S. dollars. With the Spanish
government's 1998 expenditures budgeted at
18,139.6 million pesetas (Europa Publications
2000,3616) or 243.81 million U.S. dollars, this
transfer amounts to approximately 14.7% of the
total Spanish budget. 27 Eleven of Spain's seventeen regions receive transfer funds from the EU
(Economist 200 1). With stakes so high, configuring the domestic preferences in Spain will be as
important as it is difficult. Does the Spanish
administration correctly perceive the principleagent relationship on this issue? Is the perceived
democratic deficit too large for the currently constituted leadership to overcome? Can it effectively
manage this change? What role should the EU
play, if any, in this debate? Such questions can
be answered when intergovernmentalist theory
is applied with an understanding of the specific
government structure, cultural preferences,
and personality dynamics influencing Spanish
decision-making.
Thus, as they comprise one instrument in
a greater theoretical tool-belt, government structure, culture, and leadership personality provide
us with insight into both the Irish Nice refusal
and future European policy struggles.

Matthew C Jennejohn is a senior from Dousman,
Wisconsin, majoring in international politics. Following graduation, he plans on studying comparative law with an emphasis in European
jurisprudence.

NOTES
1. Only about 38% of the electorate turned out.

2. For a full description of the Nice Treaty, see European Union 200 1.
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3. Figures taken from the official European Union
website (European Union 2001).

4. For a brief treatment of Irish EU support and the

19. For a thorough discussion of how misperception
affects policy-making, see Jervis 1976.
20. For coding scheme design, see Hermann 1983;

causes behind it, see Butler and Castle 2001.

for content analysis methodology, see "Personaliry and

5. All of the five major parties in Ireland-Fianna
Hi!, Fine Gael, Labour, the Democratic Left, and the Pro-

Government" (Hermann 1984).

Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 53 Heads of

gressive Democrats (which when combined control about

21. Coding the subjunctive in nonconditional state-

93% of the electorate -Whelan and Masterson 1998, 153)

ments is my own idea, as the subjunctive mood of verbs is

--openly supported Nice Treary ratification.

most often used when one is hedging or being overly polite

6. For instance, Sinn Fein and the Green Parry, the

if it is not used in a conditional. Coding the plural first-

only rwo parties opposing the Treary of Nice with represen-

person pronoun as low confidence is simply an adaptation

tatives in parliament, hold only three of the 166 seats in the

of Margaret Hermann's coding scheme for confidence. She

Diil (Laffan 2001,2).

codes high confidence as the use of the first-person pronoun

7. For description of the "yes" campaign's deficiencies, see Laffan 2001, 3-4.
8. Peel 2001 and Brennock 2001.

in the same situations (Hermann 1984).
22. For a scholarly discussion of the EU democratic
deficit and the debate surrounding it, see Lord 2001.

9. Liberal intergovernmentalism, championed by

23. The neofunctionalist school of thought asserts

Andrew Moravcsik, is "the most prominent and promising

that supranational actors, such as the European Commis-

rationalist account of the major turning points in the

sion, are the fundamental drivers behind EU policy-

history of European integration" (Schimmelfennig 2001,

making. For a discussion of neofunctionalism, its assumptions, origins, and explanatory purchase, see George 1994

47).
10. TO is the Irish equivalent of MP-Member of
Parliament.
11. Also contributing to the change, although at less

and Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991. For the intergovernmentalist critique of neofunctionalism, see Moravcsik 1993,
474-80.

significant levels, were Ahern's relatively lower confidence

24. This model can be found in Moravcsik 1993, 482.

during the Amsterdam decision, the recent election, and the

25. Moravcsik asserts that direct and indirect pressure

far less controversial nature of the Treary of Amsterdam (all
the thorny issues were procrastinated until Nice).
12. For an insightful comparison of PR-STV with

has the same effect on governments (1993,484).
26. I use the terms voice and exit as found in Moravcsik 1993, 484; however, these terms were introduced by

other electoral systems, see Arend Lijphart's Patterns of

Hirschman (1970). The abysmally low voter turnout is a

Democracy (1999).

good example of the exit option used during the referendum.

13. Taken from Sinnott 1995, 107.
14. Hofstede's four cultural preference continua are

27. The author's calculation taken from figures found
in Scobie 1998, 38.

found in Geert Hofstede (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (London: McGraw-Hill). The
selections cited here are taken from John Zurovchak's appli-
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SYMBOLS AND SPOILS: FRAMING AND MOBILIZING
STRUCTURES IN COLOMBIA'S ENDLESS CIVIL WAR

JOSH WHEATLEY

The civiL war that has pLagued Colombia over the past four decades is often explained in the context ofclass-based
theory. This study will examine class-based theory as it reLates to Colombian socioeconomic structure, showing that
it does not completely explain many specific elements that have developed in the war. This paper wiLL instead
analyze the use offraming mechanisms used by each faction, as weLL as the mobiLization structures in which the
framing arrangements are manipulated. Finally, it will demonstrate how the Leaders of the FARC and AUC use
these groups to promote their own interests.

A civil war has plagued Colombia over the
past four decades, causing over 35,000 deaths.
The hostilities officially began in 1964 when
leftist insurgents, responding to military aggression, formed guerilla armies seeking to overthrow the government and establish a regime
based on leftist ideology. According to classbased theory, a civil war in Colombia is neither
unusual nor unexpected. In an environment of
such obvious inequality, with masses of impoverished peasants, the system's mere structure
should eventually lead to the uniting of the
lower class in open rebellion against the upper
class. However, class-based theory does not
explain many specific elements of the Colombian Civil War and may in fact contradict
them. While the conflict originally consisted of
hostility between a movement claiming to represent the interests of the peasants and a military representing the interests of the oligarchy,
it has evolved into a completely different kind
of quarrel.

The war currently involves three principal
factions: the Colombian military, the leftwing guerilla group Colombian Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FARC), and the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Units of
Colombia (AUC). Historically, the major conflict has been between the FARC and the military, but in recent years the AUC has emerged as
a powerful force, fighting against the FARC on
their own, independent of the military. In 1998,
the Colombian military withdrew from many
FARC-controlled areas as a gestute of peace, and
since then the FARC and the AUC have
emerged as the conflict's principal actors and
enemIes.
The FARC and the AUC both claim to be
representing the interests of the common
Colombian while opposing the oppression perpetrated by the elites. Despite this, both groups
are actively involved in violating the human
rights of the citizens they profess to protect. This
article will seek to explain why the Colombian

SIGMA· 21

SYMBOLS AND SPOILS

Civil War has become a conflict in which the
principal actors are poor people fighting against
poor people. The leaders of the two groups use
culture-based collective action mechanisms to
mobilize their followers and convince them that
the cause they promote is in fact a noble venture
with a purpose to protect the Colombian culture
and way of life. Further, the leaders of these
movements are in fact significantly concerned
with advancing their own interests, using the
mobilized masses as their tools. It is the presence
of these features that challenges the assumptions
of class-based theory.
To accomplish this, I will first examine
class-based theory as it relates to the Colombian
socioeconomic structure. I will then analyze the
organization of the FARC and the AUe, focusing on both the framing mechanisms utilized by
leaders of the two groups to rally their members
to action and the mobilization structures in
which these framing arrangements are manipulated. Finally, I will examine the organization and operations of the FARC and AUC to
demonstrate how the leaders use these groups
to promote their own interests. While the bulk
of my evidence will come from studies presented
in scholarly books and journals, I will also rely
on documents produced by the FARC and the
AUC that state their official viewpoints, actions,
and goals. I will also use reports published by
international NGOs providing data about the
Colombian socioeconomic structure and statistics related to the conflict.
HISTORICAL COLOMBIAN CLASS STRUCTURE

Colombia has a history of socioeconomic
class separation. In 1849, two political parties
formed within the elite oligarchy. Those same
two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals,
are still the predominant, if not exclusive, political actors in modern Colombian politics (Kline
and Gray 2000). They are basically catch-all parties that cater to the interests of the upper and
middle classes (Boudon 2000, 35). Economic
disparity is rampant; the World Bank gives
Colombia the fifth-highest rating of disparity in
the world, with 61.5% of the wealth owned by
20% of the population. The disparity becomes
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even more evident when one realizes that, within
that sector, 46.9% of Colombia's wealth is
controlled by only the top 10% of the nation's
citizens (Center for Balanced Development
n.d.). Because of this tremendous inequality,
the peasant class has little representation in the
national political structure.
As a result of its exclusion from mainstream politics, the peasant class has historically
had to make one of two choices. Most peasants
chose to support one of the two elite parties.
Those desiring to own land and survive through
subsistence agriculrure generally followed the
Liberal party, whereas those who were content to
survive under the employ of the elite landowners
usually upheld the Conservative agenda. For
decades following the establishment of democracy, party affiliation was an important element
in nearly all Colombians' concept of cultural and
political identity (Chepesiuk 1999).
The second option, which was practiced by
a minority of the peasants, was to resort to
unconventional tactics to promote their interests. As early as the 1920s, peasant groups
attempted armed insurgency as a means to bring
about social reform, but the military easily
defeated all uprisings (Tickner 1998). In the late
1920s, Jorge Gaitan, an emerging leader of the
Liberal party, actively promoted social and agrarian reforms to benefit the lower class. However,
efforts led by radical conservatives and supported
by moderates within both parties impeded
implementation of any meaningful reform
(Hoskin and Murillo 1999).
Following the 1946 election of Conservative Ospina Perez to the presidency, violence
broke out among rural supporters of both
political parties. The conflict escalated following
the murder of Jorge Gaitan in 1948 and resulted
in a civil war known as La Violencia, a ten-year
period of extreme conflict. According to Kline
and Gray (2000), the violence was instigated
mainly by elite Conservatives, who sought to
consolidate their power, and by elite Liberals,
who sought to prevent such consolidation. During this time, radical leftist guerillas also established a presence in the countryside, hoping to
take advantage of the turbulent environment
to trigger a communist revolution. In 1953, a
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military government took power, but the fighting continued until 1958, when the Colombian
National Congress and the citizens adopted a
new institution called the National Front (Kline
and Gray 2000).
The National Front established a system of
power sharing between the two parties, which
agreed to alternate control of the executive office
until 1974 and share an equal number of elected
and appointed offices (Kline and Gray 2000).
While it established peace between these two
elitist groups, the agreement failed to address
underlying socioeconomic problems that continued to plague the population's lower class. Once
again at peace with each other, the two parties
supported a violent military campaign against
the more radical leftist insutgents that maintained demands for extensive social reforms
(Hoskin and Mutillo 1999,38-9).
Rather than promoting needed agrarian
reform, the National Front established policies to
allow increased private ownership of land in
rural areas. Under the guise of battling leftist
insutgency, the military violently displaced many
peasants from these newly privatized areas, forcing them into more remote and inhospitable
regions. The new peasant settlements often
formed community defense forces, which laid
the foundation for later formation of guerilla
armies such as the FARC and the AUC (Vargas

1998,23-4).
ClASS-BASED THEORY

Various theories seek to explain the behavior of individuals based on the socioeconomic
environment in which they live. Two of these are
structuralist and rational choice theory. Structuralist theory asserts that social systems consisting of extreme socioeconomic disparity
inevitably lead to revolution, because the system's structure ptovides the lower classes no
other way to remedy the situation. Skocpol
(1979) argues this view in case studies of the
Russian, Chinese, and French revolutions, all of
which were the result of mobilized peasant
classes overthrowing elite ruling classes.
The second class-based theory, rational
choice, also allows for economically constrained

behavior. This school of thought focuses on
"rational and strategic individuals who make
choices within constraints to obtain their desired
ends" (Levi 1997, 23). In other words, individuals determine their behavior based on the costs
and benefits of their possible actions. Individuals
living in a system of socioeconomic disparity
may view armed insurgence against the upper
class as providing great potential benefits for
future prosperity, whereas failure to rebel could
result in the continuance of poverty. In such a
case, the rational behavior would clearly be violent rebellion against the elites. Armed conflict
with other members of the lower class would not
be rational, as it would bring about few, if any,
economlC gaIns.
Skidmore and Smith (2001) analyze Latin
American politics from a structuralist, classbased perspective, focusing on such aspects as
international division of labor and resourcebased economies. While they do not include a
case study of Colombia, they do analyze classbased social movements in such nations as Mexico and Peru. Their model would predict that the
Colombian peasant class would have at some
point in history united in collective protest
against the elite upper class, with such action
resulting in at the least the creation of political
parties to represent their interests and at the
most a revolution to overthrow the oppressive
regIme.
Considering both the historical and current socioeconomic structure, the fact that civil
war has raged for thirty-seven years should not
be surprising, especially based upon the predictions of class-based theory. What is surprising is
the fact that in recent years, when the violence
has escalated to its highest levels, the nature of
the conflict has changed considerably. As the
FARC has increased its power, the AUC has
matched the escalation. However, the lowerechelon foot soldiers of both groups are made up
almost entirely of peasants from the lower
classes. Rather than a class-based struggle with
peasants fighting against elites, this conflict has
turned into a power struggle between different
groups that are able to successfully mobilize the
peasants to fight for them. In the following sections, I will examine how culture-based theory
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may help explain this apparent contradiction of
class-based theory.
FRAMING MECHANISMS

One of the key elements for successful collective action is the use of proper framing mechanisms. According to collective action theory,
framing includes the use of cultural symbols to
mobilize the masses into group participation.
Tarrow argues, "Inscribing grievances in overall
frames that identify an injustice, attribute the
responsibility for it to others, and propose solution to it is a central activity of social movements" (1998, 111). Tarrow further asserts that
movement leaders "orient their movements'
frames toward action in particular contexts and
fashion them at the intersection between a target
population's culture and their own values and
goals" (1998, 110).
Both the FARC and AUC have been successful in applying these framing mechanisms to
their own causes. Both groups have delegated the
blame for social injustices suffered by Colombian peasants to external sources. Each of the
groups also appeals to basic cultural beliefs and
desires of the Colombian peasant class. Both the
FARC and the AUC claim to be the true advocates of the Colombian people, defending the
common man against oppression by the political
and economic elites. In appealing to the concept
of cultural identity as free Colombians, these
leaders elevate their soldiers' status from that of
simple mercenaries to that of freedom fighters.
FRAMING AND THE FARC

In the early 1960s, leftist rebels officially
founded the FARC with the ultimate goal of
seizing control of the national government
through armed insurgence, becoming the first
rebel group to actively promote change through
a mainly offensive rather than defensive campaign (Vargas 2000). Since its inception, the
FARC has evolved from being a minor inconvenience for the government to its current existence as a military force of 15,000 members
and a political power controlling a significant
amount of territory (Pardo 2000, 69). FARC
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leaders have taken advantage of the continually
changing situation within Colombia to increase
their fundraising and recruiting efforts. However, their culture-based framing structures have
remained constant over the years.
FARC propaganda disseminated over the
internet helps the outside observer to understand
the group's domestic framing mechanisms.
According to its official homepage, the FARC was
established after a group of peasants withstood an
armed attack perpetrated by the Colombian military and supported by the United States. In the
wake of this attack the FARC emerged as "a revolutionary program calling together all the citizens
who dream of a Colombia for Colombians, with
equality of opportunities and equitable distribtion of wealth, and where among us all we can
build peace with social equality and sovereignty"
(FARC-EP n.d.). Throughout the years, the
number of active guerillas and the level of violence
have increased, as the FARC claims its members
remain "ready to give everything, including their
lives, to realize the dreams of equality and justice
that inspire our struggle" (FARC-EP n.d.).
FARC leaders have framed their armed
insurgence as a struggle to protect the interests of
the innocent Colombian citizen that has been
and continues to be oppressed by an elitist,
foreign-influenced government. As their webpage asserts, the FARes armed insurgence is
"an option that has been imposed upon the
Colombian people by the ruling class which
follows the orientation of the government of
the United States of America" (FARC-EP n.d).
The principal symbol used by the FARC is the
outline of the Colombian nation inscribed upon
the Colombian flag, a simple appeal to the
Colombian identity. While labeled by the government as insurgents and criminals, FARC
guerillas can view themselves as freedom fighters
possessing the honor to participate in Colombia's
liberation.
The FARC also appeals to the people
through revisiting historical incidents of peasantclass collective action. The peasant uprisings of
the 1920s and 1930s are heralded as the beginning of the people's movement to free Colombia
from socioeconomic oppression, and the leftist
movements during the period of La Violencia
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and the years that followed are considered a
continuation of the same battle and a predecessor of the current guerilla insurgence (FARC-EP
n.d.). FARC leaders have clearly taken advantage
of historical events to strengthen their framing
structure, even though most of the uprisings
prior to 1948 were supported by a faction of the
Liberal party and promoted moderate agrarian
reform that was nowhere near the FARe's current stated goal to overthrow the government
and replace it with a communist regime.
FRAMING AND THE AUC
On the other end of the conflict, the paramilitary groups of the AUC have emerged as
well-armed, capable opponents of the FARe's
guerillas. The AUe's groups trace their origins to
1965, when the government passed legislation
authorizing the military to arm civilians in order
to fight the guerillas. While this policy was later
revoked, the tradition of private armies had by
then become well established in the Colombian
culture (Chernick 1998a, 28). In the 1980s,
landowners such as drug lords and cattle ranchers began the widespread establishment of private armies to protect their holdings from the
guerillas (Richani 2000,41).
Carlos Castano first became involved in
the paramilitary movement in 1981 after FARC
guerillas kidnapped and murdered his wealthy
cattle-ranching father. Shortly thereafter, Castano allied himself with Pablo Escobar, a powerful drug lord, in a vengeful organized fight
against the guerillas. Over the years his group
gained power with support from the military and
greater revenue from the drug trade. In 1996,
Castano united various paramilitary groups to
form an organization called the United SelfDefense Units of Colombia (AUC). The AUC
has emerged as the most powerful and influential
paramilitary group, with a well-trained and wellorganized army of estimated strength as low as
4,000 active members (Richani 2000, 39) and
as high as 11,000 (Wilson 2001).
Similar to the FARe, the AUC utilizes cultural framing mechanisms to justifY its cause.
According to the AUC webpage, paramilitary
groups emerged in the late 1970s and early

1980s to defend the Colombian people from the
growing guerilla threat. The AUC propaganda
allows that the guerilla movement began with
noble intentions to bring about necessary social
and political reforms but asserts that it had
degenerated into a simple criminal operation
heavily involved in drug trafficking and kidnapping that threatened the livelihood of the rural
Colombian citizen (AUC n.d.). In the AUe's
view, this threat is also demonstrated by the
FARe's desire to take property away from
wealthy landowners, upon whom peasants rely
for land and employment.
The paramilitary group also argues that the
government and the military give priority protection to the oligarchy and fail to provide
proper protection for the lower class (AUC n.d.).
In the wake of such threats to the Colombian
way of life, it was necessary for the paramilitary
groups to step in as the defenders. The AUC also
uses the Colombian flag and map as its principal
symbols, and its very name-the United 'Self
Defense' Units of Colombia-appeals to protection of the Colombian identity.
Like the FARe, the AUC uses historical
trends to promote cultural loyalty to its cause.
AUC leaders appeal to the traditional differences
between the peasants, such as the original concept of identity determined by party affiliation
and the Conservative-supported peasant armies
of the La Violencia Civil War. They also promote
the economic model of the peasant class relying
upon large landowners to provide them with
land and employment. The AUC framing mechanism presents this system as the model that will
provide peasants the greatest levels of prosperity
and stability and identifies the agrarian redistribution agenda of the FARC as implausible and
unstable because it will lead to chaos and poverty
for the lower class (Suarez 1998).
MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES

While framing is an important aspect of
collective mobilization, an organized structure
to manage collective action must also exist. As
Tarrow states, "Social movements do not depend
on framing alone; they must bring people
together in the field, shape coalitions, confront
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opponents, and assure their own future after the
exhilaration of the peak of mobilization has
passed" (1998, 123). He further analyzes many
aspects of mobilizing structures, but one concept
particularly relevant to this case is his concept of
external resources facilitating the establishment
of these structures. While Tarrow focuses on
such external resources as the media to reach and
motivate extensive audiences, I seek to modify
his approach. I argue that actions by the Colombian government have helped to improve the
cultural image of the FARC and AUC movements, thus increasing the groups' support
among Colombian citizens and serving as external resources that have strengthened their mobilizing structures.
One of the principal external resources aiding the establishment of mobilizing structures
for both the FARC and the AUC has been the
general weakness of the Colombian government.
Perceived and actual regime weaknesses have
allowed the FARC and AUC to expand their
objectives as well as prevent the government
from intervening to stop the spread of these
groups' power and influence. FARC leaders have
lost confidence in the government's ability to
protect them and respect their interests should
they choose to lay down their arms, and AUC
leaders have recognized that the government
will not interfere with their violent counterinsurgency efforts.
The attitudes and perceptions of both
groups can largely be attributed to the emergence of Colombia as a leading international
supplier of illegal drugs, an event that has been
a key factor in exposing the regime's weakness
and inability to maintain order within its own
borders. For many years, Colombia has ceded to
pressure from the United States to reduce the
supply of illegal drugs flowing from within its
borders. In recent years, the government instituted a U.S.-sponsored program to eradicate
coca fields by spraying them with pesticides from
aircraft flying above or by sending the military to
burn them. Most of this eradication has occurred
in the southern part of the nation controlled by
the FARe, as the government has consistently
attempted to correlate the guerilla movement
with drug trafficking (Vargas 2000).
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Rather than having its power and influence
diminished by the eradication efforts, the FARC
has flourished. Many peasants hold coca cultivation as their principal source of income and view
the eradication efforts, which also damage other
crops, as a direct attack on their livelihood
(Molano 2000, 30-1). The government's eradication program has clearly been an external force
that has strengthened the FARe's mobilizing
structure while legitimizing its framing mechanisms. To the coca farmers, the FARC is their
only protection against a tyrannical government
seeking to destroy their livelihood for no apparent reason. As the FARC informs them that the
government acts this way to please a foreign
power while harming its own citizens, these
farmers become culturally committed to supporting the movement that seeks to protect
Colombia and allow them to live life according
to their desires. Most of them are then very willing to pay taxes to the FARC, and the individuals more committed to that desire to join the
noble movement protecting the Colombian way
of life choose to become active members of the
guerilla army (Vargas 2000).
While alienating its own citizens, the government's eradication program has failed to stem
the flow of coca production in southern Colombia, with most reports estimating that production
has actually increased (Aviles 2001). Drugrelated money constitutes an estimated 60% of
the FARe's yearly revenue, which has been projected to be as high as 600 million U.S. dollars a
year (Pardo 2000, 70). With the FARe's burgeoning money base and the increasing number
of displaced peasants available and committed to
join the organization, its membership has
increased from a mere 500 in 1970 to current
estimates of 15,000. The increased revenue has
assisted the FARC in paying, training, and
equipping its members, which has greatly
increased its military capability (Vargas 2000).
Not only has the eradication program
assisted in the FARe's growth, but it has also
served as an external resource to strengthen the
AUe's mobilizing structure. As the government
and military consistently assert that the guerilla
movement and drug trafficking are one and
the same, they fail to address the issue of drug
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production in areas controlled by the AUe.
Various reports imply that the AUC is much
more involved in the drug trade than the FARe,
but the government refuses to acknowledge or
address this claim (Montalvo 2000, 9-10). In
attacking its principal enemy while leaving the
AUC alone, the government has helped to legitimize the paramilitary movement. Supporters of
the AUC may desire political reform, but they
do not wish for the complete overthrow of the
regime sought by the guerillas. Seeing the government actively working toward the same goal
as the AUC likely strengthens their cultural
resolve that the paramilitaries really do seek the
welfare of the Colombian nation.
Increasing drug-related revenue has
allowed the AUC to become better equipped and
better trained, resulting in more military successes. While individuals truly culturally committed to the AUC would sustain the group in
times of success and failure, victories are always
better than losses for fortifYing support. A proud
Colombian may see the realization of national
success and prosperity as inevitable, and if the
AUC is providing the mechanism through which
that goal is obtained, it must be the true proponent of Colombian culture and identity.
Prior to the coca eradication project, other
actions by the government had also bolstered the
strength of the two groups. Throughout the civil
war, various administrations had attempted to
make peace with the FARe. In 1984, the FARC
and the military declared a cease-fire, and many
members of the FARC established a legitimate
communist party known as the Patriotic Union
(UP). While the government and the FARC
seemed to desire peace, other interested parties
did not. Over the next two years paramilitaries
and drug traffickers murdered over 3,000 members of the UP, causing it to be virtually nonexistent. The deaths were rarely investigated and
few if any of those responsible were prosecuted
(Vargas 1998, 25). As a result of the government's failure to protect its members attempting
to assimilate into the political sphere, the FARC
gained new resolve to continue its armed insurgency. Similarly, paramilitaries realized that the
government either could not or would not stop
them from murdering their enemies, which

encouraged them to continue doing it. While
this event preceded the AUe, it laid the foundation for the formation of future paramilitary
groups.
Government failures continued to facilitate
the strengthening of the rebel groups' mobilization structures. In 1994, Ernesto Sam per
assumed the office of president, actively promoting peace negotiations with the FARe. However,
shortly after his inauguration, reports surfaced
that he had accepted campaign donations from
various drug cartels, and he instantly lost nearly
all credibility. The FARC immediately withdrew
from peace negotiations, and during the next
few years escalated its offensive campaign to the
highest levels ever (Suarez 1998). The paramilitaries responded by also increasing their strength,
which likely factored into the formation of the
AUC (Richani 2000, 39). In this case, as Chernick asserts, the corruption of one political
leader provided extensive external fortification of
the groups' mobilization structures:
With Satnper reduced to practicing the politics of
survival, the growing vacuum at the center of power
has prompted matlY political sectors-Congress, the
military, party leaders, gatnonales, business, paramilitaries, guerillas-to push their own agendas
and take advatltage of the executive's weakness.
(1998b,41)

FARC AND AUC LEADERS:
CULTURAL CRUSADERS OR RATIONAL ACTORS?
Until now, I have focused on framing mechanisms and mobilization structures used by the
FARC and AUC to legitimize their movements
and recruit membership. However, leaders of
these groups have utilized these mobilization
devices not just to establish their organizations but
also to promote their own interests. Though I feel
that culture-based theoty is a more viable explanation for Colombia's apparent contradiction of
class-based theory, rational choice theory also
deserves consideration. Not only has this crusade
promoted positive action for the group, but the
actions of the FARC and AUC have also provided
individual-level benefits to their leaders, providing
them rational incentives to continue the fight.
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While there appears to be strong evidence
that cultural framing plays an important role in
mobilizing members of the FARC and the AUe,
rational choice theorists could argue that membership in these organizations results simply
from rational actors seeking to further their own
economic interests. It is certain that members of
these factions are mercenaries; they receive
monthly income for their efforts, and both
groups generally pay better than the military
(Chepesiuk 1999, 8). They may also feel that
failure to join one of the groups will bring about
accusations by both factions that they support
the other, which may threaten their future survival. An examination of each group's leadership
may prove useful in evaluating the merit of
rational choice theory in this context.
THE FARC LEADERSHIP

As he entered office in 1998, President
Andres Pastrana showed his interest in negotiating peace with the FARC by ceding to its
demand that the military withdraw from a
42,000 square kilometer area in southern
Colombia. He was also willing to discuss offering clemency to FARC leaders and allowing
them to participate in the government if they
were willing to make peace. The Barco administration had made a similar offer to the M-19 terrorist group in 1991, which resulted in that
organization's demilitarization and the assimilation of its members into the legitimate political
sphere (Tickner 1998,62).
FARC leaders gladly accepted control of
the area, but rather than responding with their
own peaceful overtures, they converted the
region into a virtual sovereign state within
Colombia and then escalated the hostility. The
FARC now uses the demilitarized zone to recruit
and train new soldiers, cultivate coca crops, hide
hostages and kidnap victims, and execute prisoners (Pardo 2000). FARC leaders are also exerting increasing influence in the local politics of
municipalities they control. In some cities,
FARC operatives manage such simple tasks as
issuing marriage licenses and building permits.
Reports have surfaced claiming that since
assuming total power over the region, the FARC
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leadership has become divided over issues such as
local power struggles and corruption involving
taxes and other public funds (Chernick 2000,
36-7).
The desire to control local politics and the
subsequent spoils, the kidnapping of the citizens
they are supposed to protect, and the escalation
of the war effort in response to peaceful gestures
by the government do not prove that FARC
leaders are fully self-interested, but this evidence
does raise the possibility that their agenda
includes more than just achieving socioeconomic
equality for the peasants. Pardo asserts that the
FARC's estimated $600 million per year revenue
makes it the wealthiest rebel group in the history
of the earth (2000, 70), which raises the legitimate question of whether its leaders receive economic kickbacks to complement their political
and military power.
THE AUC LEADERSHIP
Behind all the rhetoric of defending the
Colombian citizen and the Colombian way of
life, the AUC seems to be little more than a wellarmed and well-organized crime syndicate. Various independent studies such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch report
that since its inception the AUC has been
responsible for 70% of war-related human rights
abuses (Aviles 2001, 43-5; Human Rights
Watch n.d.). AUC soldiers are routinely involved
in massacres of peasants they accuse of cooperating with the guerillas. After a well-planned paramilitary operation that resulted in the murder of
thirty civilians in the town of Mapiripan, Carlos
Castano was quoted as saying, "These were not
innocent peasants. They were guerillas dressed as
peasants" (Chernick 1998a, 31).
As stated previously, the AUC is likely to
be heavily involved in drug trafficking. Exact
data on the AUe's drug-related revenue is scarce,
but there are other indicators that the selfdefense force is also a business venture. Similar
to the FARe, the AUC has begun to develop
an extensive presence in the local politics of
municipalities in its sphere of influence,
including taxation of legitimate businesses to
complement its taxation of coca production.
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Perhaps a stronger indication is a recent report in
the Colombian newspaper El Nuevo Herald citing
evidence that a power struggle was occurring
within the AUC leadership and that Castano
faced increasing difficulties in controlling the
actions oflower-levelleaders operating in the field
(Rodriguez 2001). An organization that exists
solely to promote the defense of Colombia will
not likely have great internal dissention, but when
power over local politics and the extreme potential wealth of the drug trade are factored in, such
conflict becomes much more realistic.
The prevalence of former military officers
in the AUC leadership also raises questions
abour the organization's true motives. To contradict negative press reporting that the military
and the AUC have close ties, the government has
demanded that the military punish its members
who do in fact associate with and support the
paramilitaries. Many officers have been censured, and some expelled, but a great number of
them have simply taken high-paying positions in
the AUC command structure (Chernick 1998a,
31-2). It is possible that these military officers
identifY with the AUC and support its ideology,
but it is more likely that the group has sufficient
money to lure such individuals into its ranks.
The officers can provide the soldiers with invaluable training, which will increase the likelihood
of military success and the expansion of the
sphere of influence.
CULTURE OR RATIONAL CHOICE?

The extreme flexibility of rational choice
theory makes it possible to successfully apply
that approach to almost any situation, but I
feel that in this case the cultural aspects cannot
be ignored. As stated earlier, FARC membership
does not likely exceed 15,000, with AUC membership likely fewer than 11,000. While these are
considerable numbers for groups of such nature,
they still constitute a small minority of Colombia's population of 40 million. Economic hardships have abounded in Colombia in recent
years, but many destitute peasants have chosen
to move to urban areas seeking work rather than
hiring on with the FARC or the AUe. If enlisting in these armies was truly the best economic

option available, and the people were completely
self-interested, the membership of these groups
would grow exponentially to mirror more closely
the estimated 80% of the population who live in
poverty.
Further, rational actors seeking to promote
their own interests will not likely risk their lives
on a daily basis, even if it comes with a paycheck.
Death is a risk for many members of each group.
Members of the FARC and the AUC must face
the prospect of armed engagements with each
other and with the Colombian military, the possibility of torture at the hands of their enemies
should they be captured, and reprisal from their
comrades should they choose to withdraw from
active involvement (Richani 2000). Similarly,
one might argue that the FARC and theAUC are
havens for career criminals seeking unconventional employment; certainly a number of these
individuals are found within the ranks, but for
a truly rational criminal, employment with a
private drug cartel would likely provide much
better hope for survival and future economic
prosperity.
No single social science theory can explain
any situation completely. In the case of the
Colombian Civil War, rational choices do play
some role in the decisions of individuals to join
the FARC or the AUe. However, culturally
based factors also playa significant, if not major,
role in explaining how movement leaders have
mobilized masses of peasants to support their
causes. Along with fighting for a paycheck,
lower-echelon members of FARC and AUC are
also battling for the protection of the Colombian
way of life. This brings about the question of
whether the leaders of these movements have the
Colombian citizens' best interests in mind, or if
their efforts to organize private armies in the
name of Colombian preservation are complex
fronts disguising their true desires to further
their own material gains.
CONCLUSION

Despite claims made by the government
and other factions that they desire peace, all
indicators show that the level of violence in the
Colombian Civil War is not subsiding and is
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more likely escalating. Recent U.S. foreign policy
includes an aid package to provide the Colombian military with equipment and training to
escalate the fight against drug supplies. The government continues to assert that the FARC is the
nation's principal institution of drug trafficking
and has stated its desire to use the new military
strength to make a final push into the south,
implying a desire to once again take the offensive
to FARC-controlled areas Qohnson 2000). Such
an event would have significant effects on the
future of both the FARC and the AUe.
The FARC and AUC have successfully
used culture-based collective action mechanisms
to mobilize followers to their cause. If the
increasing foreign influence on Colombian
domestic politics has adverse affects on the peasant population, it is likely that the FARC's cultural framing mechanism as Colombia's national
protector will continue to grow stronger, either
leading to an increase in its political and military
influence or an increase in casualties as the
violence escalates. If the FARC is significantly
weakened by a new military offensive, the AUC
will likely grow stronger, and it will be interesting to see if the paramilitaries will continue to
adapt their cultural framing approach to 'the
changing situation. It also remains to be seen
what approach AUC leaders will take to legitimize their cause should the anti-drug efforts
begin to target them to the same degree as the
FARe.
The leaders of these organizations take
advantage of their armies to promote their own
welfare. While the evidence I have presented
does not prove that leaders of the FARC and
AUC are simply self-interested individuals seeking to satisfY their own interests, I do maintain
that enough evidence exists to raise questions
about their motives. The extreme amount of
money involved in the drug trade, the internal
divisions within the leadership of the groups, the
FARC's kidnapping of individuals it professes
to protect, and the AUC's slaughter of peasants
it claims to defend all cast doubt upon the
motives presented by these groups to their own
members as well as to the world. Despite the fact
that the military has scaled back its counterinsurgency efforts and the government appears
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willing to negotiate peace, the FARC and the
AUC continue to fortifY themselves and escalate
their offensive campaigns. Perhaps the best summation of the situation is provided by Guerrero
Baron: each of the warring factions believes it can
win, so they do not wish to negotiate (2001, 18).
The years to come may determine the victor of
the civil war and the emergent dominant Colombian culture, or the proponents of conflicting
interests and ideologies may continue to do
battle for an indefinite period of time.

Josh Wheatley is a senior from Clinton, Utah,
majoring in international politics. After graduation
he will attend the Master of Pacific and International Affoirs program at the University of California San Diego.
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THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

1776-1800

ADAM L.

PERSCHON

United States citizens have enjoyed a press that is free and unrestrained since the late eighteenth century. However, there is little agreement upon what the freedom ofthe press meant when it was drafted in the Bill ofRights
as part of the First Amendment. The First Amendment itself offers little explanation of what liberties the press is
entitled to. This study will examine state constitutions, debates, opinions, newspaper articles, essays, and court
cases to present diffirent interpretations ofFreedom ofthe Press by 1800. Opposing lliewpoints are presented and
discussed to symbolize the general sentiments ofAmerican society during this time period.

Freedom of the Press has been and continues to be one of the most highly celebrated freedoms enjoyed by citizens of the United States.
Americans have exercised this constitutional
freedom for over two centuries, beginning with
the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791
(O'Connor and Sabato 2000, 43). The legacy of
press freedom is indeed longlived, but its limits
and interpretations have not been definitive or
exact. It is this lack of definition that has
spurred debates as old as the Constitution itself.
The assumption can be made that the framers of
the American government meant something by
placing the term "Freedom of the Press" among
other First Amendment rights, but its exact meaning remains unclear (Hay 1799, 38). This study
will examine what freedom of the press meant in
the United States between 1776 and 1800 byanalyzing original evidence from state constitutions,
material discussed in debates, printed public opinion, newspaper articles, essays, and court cases.

LITERATURE REvIEW

Freedom of the press has been accustomed
to examination and interpretation since its ideo-

logical inception. Historians have studied this
"great bulwark of liberty" from nearly every
possible perspective using a variety of methods.
The focus of this study is to more clearly define
what press freedoms the First Amendment was
intended to protect. The research for this study,
as well as its conclusions, are original. However,
it is not the first work of its kind. The works of
Leonard W Levy, Jeffery A. Smith, and Margaret A. Blanchard closely resemble the focus of
this study.
Leonard W. Levy described the conclusions of his research on freedom of the press in
two books, Legacy of Suppression and Emergence
of a Free Press. In his first book, Legacy of Suppression (1960), Levy concluded that the ideas
and philosophies of a free press did not match
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the legal practices III colonial America. He
acknowledged the existence of wide spread ideas
concerning what freedoms the press should enjoy
but argued that legal restraints, state laws and
practices against a free press were a better judgment of American sentiments about the press.
Levy labeled this book as "revisionist history"
because his conclusions led him to believe that
the press in America was actually subject to suppression to a greater degree than it was free.
Levy's second book, Emergence of a Free
Press (1985), was written as a correction for
Legacy of Suppression. In its preface, Levy stated
that he had exaggerated his thesis in the first
book and had come to different conclusions after
an extended examination of newspaper sources.
He said he had failed to examine the practices
of the press itself in its criticism of government
and public officials. Levy still felt that the press
in colonial America was more suppressed than
mainstream libertarian thought, but less so
than he had originally stated.
Jeffery A. Smith concluded a much more
libertarian approach in Printers and Press Freedom
(1988). He stated that the American people
believed that a free press was an integral part to
democracy, serving as an effective check on the
abuse of power. He also stated that early Americans recognized that false printed material could
be a form of personal injury, bur that they were
willing to tolerate it in order to receive information from the press. Smith concluded that the
framers used the strongest possible terms in
the First Amendment to preserve the freedom
of the press for themselves and future generations.
Margaret A. Blanchard, author of Revolutionary Sparks: Freedom of Expression in Modern
America and History of the Mass Media in the
United States: An Encyclopedia, defined what freedom of the press meant by 1804 using six criteria.' These criteria imply that freedom of the
press meant several things and cannot be captured in one general trend of thought (Blanchard
1999,118).
The works cited here do not comprise a
comprehensive list of studies done on original
interpretations of freedom of the press in America. They are, however, some of the most authoritative and closest in resemblance to this study.
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METHODOLOGY

The primary methodology used in this
project was a critical analysis of documents about
freedom of the press originating between 1730
and 1800. The antiquity and inaccessibility of
these documents did not allow original copies to
be examined, necessitating the use of reprints and
microfilmed copies in lieu of the original materials. The works cited in this study are exclusively
primary sources, taking exception only for the
works of contemporary historians that were used
for comparison and contrast of this study.
The foundation of this analysis was provided by an inspection of state constitutions that
were put into place between the signing of the
Declaration of Independence and the dawning
of the nineteenth century. This was done in an
attempt to gain a better understanding of what
freedom of the press meant to Americans during
this period. As a collective group, the state constitutions provide a much more narrow description of press liberties than the absolute wording
of the First Amendment. The constitutions were
analyzed for recurring themes or ideas about the
press, as well as any unique philosophies in each
state. It was also determined whether the states
revised any clauses about press freedoms in their
constitutions after the federal Constitution was
ratified. Leonard W Levy did a very similar
examination of state constitutions in Legacy of
Suppression but focused more on comparisons
between common law and constitutional law
(1960, 183-8).
To add to the foundation of constitutional
law concerning press freedoms, written and
spoken arguments of the framers, lawmakers,
judges, printers, newspaper editors, and concerned citizens were examined. This provided
some interpretation to the law and revealed
opposing viewpoints. More weight was placed
upon the statements of individuals directly
involved in the government and creation of law.
The remainder of the statements analyzed was
weighted according to descending priorities
marked by the list above. The material for this
portion of the study was found in congressional
debate records, essays, pamphlets, and newspapers of the era.
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This study further focused on how the
press was punished under libel laws. This was
done to verifY whether or not existing state libel
laws were actually enforced and, if so, to what
degree. The enforcement level of libel laws during this period is an indicator of how strongly
Americans felt that a printer was responsible for
what he/she printed. The only sources for libel
cases used in this study were reports from period
newspapers.
CONSTIruTIONAL RIGHTS

When the Declaration of Independence
was signed on July 4, 1776, the thirteen British
colonies in America claimed they were no longer
subject to the government and laws of their
mother country. This claim was founded upon a
philosophy that allowed citizens of a nation "to
alter or to abolish" any government that violated
certain "unalienable rights" granted to men by
their creator (O'Connor and Sabato 2000, 375).
Independence was not gained through this document alone, but this bold statement paved the
way for the establishment of a new and highly
experimental government.
Although the colonies were free to establish
a form of government after they had separated
themselves from England, the permeation of the
English law system within the colonies still provided a foundation for the establishment of the
Articles of Confederation and, later, the American Constitution. Similarities between the
American and English law systems are prevalent
today. But despite similarities, the developing
American government sought after freedoms
that were not as well established in England at
the time of the Constitution's ratification. One
such freedom, the freedom of the press, worked
its way into the Constitution as one of the most
valued freedoms.
The ideologies of providing freedoms for
the press were not new to colonists at the time
of the Declaration of Independence. Debates
over this issue, more specifically licensing and
restraining the press, were common in England
and in the colonies during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. These debates provided the
roots for press freedoms in the United States.

However, for this study, interpretations of the
original meaning of freedom of the press in America will be taken from constitutional laws and
debates in the United States from 1770 to 1800.
In 1777, delegates representing the
colonies formed the Articles of Confederation.
This was the first format of national government
for the declared independent colonies. It can be
considered as a national governing body, but it is
better represented as a "firm league of friendship"
(Thorpe 1909, 1:10). Because the colonies, now
called states, existed prior to the Articles of Confederation, this government allowed each state to
retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence. The national government outlined in this
document was very weak and had limited powers. No freedoms were protected by the Articles
of Confederation, because those rights were to be
protected within each state according to its own
constitutions and laws.
The Articles of Confederation were considered to be inadequate by the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. The delegates of this convention drafted a constitution that created a
stronger national government, but the majority
of rights remained under the jurisdiction of each
state (O'Connor and Sabato 2000,32-3). Some
states ratified this constitution on condition that
a bill of rights would be included to protect citizens of each state from the national government.
Among the rights listed in the First Amendment
of the Bill of Rights is freedom of the press. The
First Amendment states: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances" (Thorpe 1909, 1:29).
Because the First Amendment contains all
of what is written in the Constitution about the
freedom of the press, it is critical to examine each
of the state constitutions of the period to gain a
general understanding of what freedom of the
press meant to the developing nation. Prior to
the ratification of the United States Constitution
in 1789, eleven of the thirteen states had drafted
and approved state constitutions after their separation from England. Out of these eleven states,
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eight had statements concerning freedoms
that the press should be allowed to exercise.
Among the eight states were New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia. Three prominent themes are outlined in
the constitutions of this collective group. First,
freedom of the press is essential to the security
of freedom in a state and is one of the great
bulwarks of liberty. Second, the freedom of the
press should be inviolably preserved. Third, no
restrictions or restraints should be placed upon
the press (Thorpe 1909, 2:785; 3:1690, 1892;
4:2456; 5:2788,3083; 6:3257; 7:3814).
By 1792, just one year after the Bill of
Rights was ratified, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Delaware had drafted new versions of
their constitutions. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1792 made no changes in its freedom
of the press statement (Thorpe 1909, 4:2474).
Delaware, who had made no reference to the
freedom of the press in their constitution of
1776, made specific references that the press
should enjoy in their constitution of 1792. Section Five of Article One stated that the press
was free to any citizen in the examination of
the conduct of men acting in public capacity,
that citizens could print on any subject with a
responsibility for any abuses of that liberty, and
that the truth could be given as a defense in
indictments for libel in matters of publication
proper for public information (Thorpe 1909,
1:569).
The freedoms outlined in the 1792
Delaware constitution added several important
elements to the definition of a free press.
Delaware was the second state to declare constitutionally that an individual was responsible for
what he/she printed. Noting this responsibility,
the truth as a defense in a libel suit was also
granted. The combination of these rights and
responsibilities explain Delaware's understanding
of the importance of a free press and its acknowledgment of the rights of an individual.
Pennsylvania also altered its statement
about freedom of the press in its 1790 constitution. It was the most extensive and descriptive
definition of the freedom of the press to that
point in time.
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That the printing-presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of
the legislature, or any branch of government, and no
law shall ever be made ro restrain the right thereo£
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is
one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen
may freely speak, write, and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In
prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or where the matter is published is
proper for public information, the truth thereof may
be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels
the jury shall have a right ro determine the law and
the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other
cases. (Thorpe 1909, 1:569)

The language used in this statement is similar to
that found in the 1792 Delaware Constitution.
However, Pennsylvania adds that a communication of thoughts and opinions is an invaluable
right of man.
Connecticut and Rhode Island were the
only states that had not adopted official constitutions between 1776 and 1792. Connecticut
adopted its first constitution in 1818 and Rhode
Island followed in 1842. Both of these constitutions stated that citizens had the right to freely
speak, write, and publish on any subject, but
they were responsible for the abuses of that liberty. In addition, Rhode Island allowed the truth
to be used as a defense in libel charges (Thorpe
1909, 1:537; 6:3224). Even though the constitutions of these two states were not ratified for
many years after the time period being studied, it
is important to note that they included some
protections for the press.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

After the American Constitution was
drafted in 1787, debates developed throughout
the country on the proposed plan for government. Much of the opposition to the Constitution resulted from the its lack of guaranteed
rights for individuals. A compromise would later
be reached with the addition of ten amendments
that outlined specific freedoms that the national
government could not infringe upon. It is evident
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from historical records that those involved in the
government process were deeply concerned with
the freedom of the press. The Constitution, even
with the First Amendment, does not provide
much of an explanation as to what extent freedoms of the press would be guaranteed. An
examination of the debates between public
officials and other men of high social standing
clarifies this very subject.
A common theme exists among those who
were opposed to the ratification of the Constitution. In general, these individuals were concerned that the new government would trample
upon the rights of the people if those rights were
not specifically protected by constitutional law.
The dissenting minority of the Pennsylvania ratifYing convention objected to the Constitution in
part because there were no statements in it protecting the freedom of the press (Pole 1987, 69).
George Mason, who was a member of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, also stated his
concern that many freedoms were not specifically addressed in the Constitution. In a speech
to the Virginia ratifYing convention, Mason
emphasized that the liberty of the press, trial by
jury, and the danger of standing armies in time
of peace were liberties that were of priority to
protect (Mason 1787).
The statements made by Mason and dissenting members of the Pennsylvania ratifYing
convention are typical of the sentiments
expressed by those in opposition to the Constitution. Patrick Henry, one of the most nationally prominent opponents of the Constitution,
was more detailed in his statements. Henty
addressed the Virginia ratifYing convention in
1788, comparing the new government to the
separation from Great Britain. He claimed that
both movements were radical and founded
upon the rights that all men should enjoy.
Henty did not want to see the rights that he
and other Americans had fought for during the
Revolutionary War extinguished (Pole 1987,
117).
Those in favor of the Constitution were
more specific in their arguments about what
liberties the press should exercise. In Federalist
No. 84, Alexander Hamilton made a bold argument that the freedom of the press is not easily

defined, nor can it be better preserved through
constitutional protections. He argued:
For why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it
be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restriction may be imposed? ..
On the subject of the liberty of the press, as
much has been said, I cannot forbear adding a
remark or rwo: In the first place, I observe that there
is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of
this state, and in the next, I contend that whatever
has been said about in that of any other state,
amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration
that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved?" What is the liberty of the press? Who can
give it any definition which would not leave the
utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this, I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any
constitution respecting it, must altogether depend
on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the
people and of the government. And here, after all, as
intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for
the only solid basis of all our rights. (Hamilton

1788,315-6)

Hamilton provides insight to the difficulty of
defining the freedom of the press. According
to the argument presented here, the spirit of
the people and public opinion should be the
defining voice of press freedoms.
PUBLIC OPINION

The arguments about freedom of the press
were not limited to those directly involved in
creating public policies and law. Citizens voiced
their opinions in private conversation, public
debate, and written works-including a flurry of
public opinion expressed through the medium
of newspapers and pamphlets. This resource will
be used to gauge the various opinions held by
citizens of the new nation.
In opinions expressed through newspapers
and pamphlets, the purpose of the press is
brought to the attention of the reader in nearly
every case. In an article from the Salem Chronicle
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and Essex Advertiser on 30 March 1786, the
existence of the press was justified. It claimed
that "a licensed press is worse than none," and if
a "notion be absurd, the opinion false, the system
iniquitous, the press will sooner or later ridicule,
refute, and expose them all." The article further
emphasized the need for a free press as an instrument to root out the evil from society.
Excerpts from newspapers and pamphlets
also reveal sentiments concerning the role and
rights of the press. The following quotations are
examples of such excerpts. "Freedom of the
press will contribute more to the freedoms and
happiness of the people, than all of the combined strength of your National Militia." "Let
every man ... have the freedoms of publishing
his own sentiments on all subjects; but let
every man be responsible to God, and to
the laws which ought to be established for the
sake of peace and tranquility" (Newport Herald,
17 December 1788).
Debates over the Bill of Rights as a necessity to the Constitution were also common in
newspapers of the period. Two views were generally presented. An article published in the
Gazette of the United States (15 April 1789) s~p
ported the establishment of the federal Constitution. It stated that Americans had derived
permanent advantages from a free press and that,
"having been inspired by sentiments of heroism
and sound policy derived from this origin, to
establish an independent empire, and adopt a
glorious federal constitution; they are enthusiastic to preserve and perpetuate this inestimable
jewel." The article focused on how the press
would be maintained through the Constitution
with an addition of expressed rights.
An opposing viewpoint was expressed in the
Pennsylvania Gazette (17 October 1787). It
argued that an amendment outlining a free press
"would have been merely nugatory to have introduced a formal declaration upon the subjectnay, that very declaration might have been
construed to imply that some degree of power was
given, since we undertook to define its extent."
The relationship between constitutional
law and the freedom of the press sparked yet
another viewpoint. An essay written by an
anonymous American citizen published in the
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New Haven Gazette on 29 November 1787
expresses the opinion this way:
It is alleged that the liberty of the press is not guaranteed by the new constitution. But this objection is
wholly unfounded. The liberty of the press does not
come within the jurisdiction of federal government.
It is firmly established in all the states either by law,
or positive declarations in bills of right; and not being
mentioned in the federal constitution, is not and can
not be abridged by congress. It stands on the basis of
the respective state constitutions.

Using these viewpoints as a sample of public
sentiment that can be generalized to the American people, two conclusions can be drawn.
First, the states had constitutions and laws that
were sufficient to regulate the press and protect
its necessary freedoms. Second, the federal
government should not be allowed to regulate
the press, regardless of whether the press was
specifically protected by the federal Constitution or not.
RESPONSIBILIlY OF PRINTERS

There was not a group more concerned by
the various arguments presented about the freedom of the press during the last two decades of
the eighteenth century than the printers and
publishers. It is clear from state constitutional
law that any individual had the right to think,
speak or write whatever they wished, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty. As citizens, printers were also given this right, but the
nature of their commercial endeavors created a
situation requiring a more concrete definition of
laws and responsibilities for the printer. It is not
surprising that most of the discussion on these
issues was introduced by printers themselves;
however, differing viewpoints were presented.
Benjamin Franklin, successful printer and
innovator of many printing practices, published
"An Apology for Printers" in 1731. Franklin
wrote the pamphlet as a rebuttal to criticisms
he had received for printing sundry articles
during his career. A list of considerations was
presented by Franklin to describe the printer's
role. A brief summary of this list follows to
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capture the essence of Franklin's thoughts
(1952, 1-10):
1. The opinions of men are as various as their faces.
2. Printing has chiefly to do with the opinions
of men and printing promotes some and opposes
others.
3. Printing is prone to offending people, while other
trades rarely offend anyone.
4. It is unreasonable for anyone to expect to be
pleased with everything that is printed.
5. Printers should print opposing opinions, allowing
the public to decide the truth of a dispute.
6. Indifference should be exhibited by any printer
publishing opposing opinions.
7. It is unreasonable to imagine that printers approve
of everything that they print. If this were the case, all
that is printed would be the printer's opinion only.
8. If printers were determined not to print anything
that might offend someone, very little would be
printed.
9. If vicious or silly things are printed, often it is
because the people are corruptly educated and do
not encourage the printing of quality material.
10. Printers often discourage the printing of bad
things, even at the expense of losing business.

The observations Franklin made were not
derived from law, nor were they arguing for specific freedoms that printers should be permitted.
However, they are an important factor in defining what the freedom of the press was in 1731.
Although it was written many years before the
period under study, its theoretical themes parallel those within the period and offer an expanded
opinion on the responsibilities of printers.
Franklin does not make reference to the legal
responsibilities printers should be held accountable for, but he does suggest that printers should
be ethical and socially responsible. The conclusion of "An Apology for Printers" emphasizes
that the press should not be restricted just
because men cannot agree upon its purpose and
role in society (Franklin 1952,21-4).
The publishers of newspapers were also
active in declaring their role in society as well as
defining what the press should be used for.
Edward Powars, in an article in The American
Herald and Worcester Recorder on 21 August

1788, had a different approach than Franklin
about the influence of a printer's opinion. He
said that a printer "conceives it as an incumbent
duty, to explain his views, and to declare the
principles by which his future conduct will be
regulated." Powars also argued that only that
which adds to the betterment of the society
should be published and that a printer should be
impartial to printing edifYing works.
An essay originally printed in the Pennsylvania Gazette and reprinted in the Berkshire
Chronicle on 5 June 1788, signed Philodemos,
was directed to printers in the United States concerning their conduct. The main argument of
the essay was that the press could threaten
its own freedoms through improper conduct of
printers. In order to prevent this from occurring,
the author made suggestions for printers' conduct. First, a printer should remain independent
and uninfluenced by others in his writing. Second, a printer should remain dignified and
refrain from using the press to mistakenly censure others. Third, it is the responsibility of the
printer to determine what is appropriate to print.
This point made reference to the right of the
people to print, but that they were also held
accountable for their words. Fourth, the first
duty of a printer is owed to society. This is
explained as a willingness to publish all just censures no matter how bold they may be. Fifth, a
printer should publish works that are innocent
and chaste.
Thomas Greenleaf of the printing office of
New York added another suggestion to printers
in an article published originally in the New York
Journal. He said that a printer should allow his
press to be free for all parties and a vehicle for
discussion. If this was not done, Greenleaf said
lovers of a republic should begin to fear
(reprinted in The American Herald and Worcester
Recorder on 21 August 1788).
LIBEL

Constitutional laws, official debate, and
opinions expressed by the public are necessary
elements to produce a definition of freedom of
the press. However, it is by action and not by
theory through which society's true feelings are
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manifested. The ideology that the press should be
punished for publishing defamatory material was
debated, but most often upheld by courts of law.
The actions taken against the freedom of
the press were focused on punishments for the
printers of libelous material. An examination of
essays and the proceedings of state and federal
courts will demonstrate that a printer was indeed
held responsible for printing falsities against an
individual.
In 1790, Edmond Freeman was placed on
trial in Massachusetts for accusing John Gardner
of murdering his wife. These accusations had
been made without any evidence of Gardner's
guilt. Gardner spoke to the court of the importance of the justice system and the necessity of
laws. He said, "Those laws have not left it in the
hand of any printer to execute anyone of his
fellow-citizens without evidence, trial, or conviction" (in Berkshire Chronicle and Massachusetts
Intelligencer, 4 March 1790). Gardner expressed
concern that the press had tried to take on the
role of the justice system.
In the case against Freeman, Gardner read
from Hawkins Pleas ofthe Crown to define libel.
He read: "That a libel, in a strict sense, is taken
for a malicious defamation expressed either in
printing or writing, and tending to either
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or the
reputation of one who is alive, and to expose him
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule" (from
same article as cited above). Gardner also quoted
a statement that made no distinction in the
defamation of private and public persons. The
case Gardner presented was convincing enough
to find Freeman guilty of the libel charge.
Alexander Addison, president of the
county courts of Pennsylvania, made an address to a grand jury in 1799, printed in the
Columbian Centinel, 1799. The address was
focused on a printer's responsibility. He defined
the liberty of the press in this way:
The principles of liberty, therefore, the rights of
Man, require that our right in communicating information, as to facts and opinions, be so restrained, as
not to infringe the right of reputation. Unless it be
so restrained, there is no liberty; for there is no just
enjoyment of our rights. And if every man's right of
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communication be unrestrained, every man's right
of reputation is unguarded; and there is, in this
respect, universal licentiousness, and each man is at
the mercy of every man; the most precarious and
oppressive of all states.

It is evident that Addison was concerned about
unrestrained press only a few short years after the
foundation of the American government. He
alluded to the necessity of restraining one's
rights to some degree to avoid the trampling
of another.
After defining libel, Addison explained the
differences between the right of Pennsylvania
and the United States to prosecute for libel. He
explained that Congress had recently passed the
Sedition Bill, which would allow the prosecution
of individuals opposing the government. Anything written or uttered against the government
in a false, scandalous, or malicious way would be
eligible for a fine and imprisonment. Addison
then argued that if the United States Congress
had the power to enact this law, Pennsylvania
also had the right to enact libel laws. The rights
guaranteed to the press were much less restrictive
in Pennsylvania's constitution than the federal
Constitution.
George Hay argued in an essay to republican printers in the United States in 1799 that the
federal government did not have the power to
punish libel, thus invalidating the Sedition Bill.
Speaking of the federal government, he said,
"that so much of the Sedition Bill as relates to
libels in the government, or the individuals
belonging to it, is not within the words of meaning of the constitution. It will not be said that
the power of punishing libels is expressly given.
Several offenses are numerated which may be
defined and punished by the general government; but libels are not included" (Hay 1799,
10). Hay questioned where the federal government received its power to punish libels when
that power was not expressly given. He further
explained that the question had not been and
could not be answered.
There was at least one argument to explain
the source of the federal governments power to
punish libel. Supporters of this argument
claimed that the common law of England was
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in torce in the United States. This meant that
the government could punish libel by traditional laws inherited from the English law
system. Hay offered a rebuttal to this claim,
stating that the United States Constitution had
not declared the common laws of England to be
a part of the American law system (Hay 1799,
27). He said, "Law is a rule prescribed by the
supreme power of the state. The supreme power
of the United States has not declared the common law of England to be in force here" (Hay
1799, 28).
Hay did claim the states had the right to
punish libels. He said, "The state governments
have yet a right to prescribe a punishment for
slander, which effects the reputation of individuals, whether the slander be by speech, writing, or
printing. Before the federal government was
formed they possessed this power, and must yet
retain it, unless it has been surrendered" (Hay
1799, 20).
Hay also spoke of the need to "draw a line
between the freedom and licentiousness of press"
(1799, 35). He said the legal and political writers of England had attempted to draw this line
but could never conle to a conclusion as to where
it should be placed. Hay contended that the
United States, being a republican government,
ought to inform its citizens of the exact and precise extent of every law (1799, 35-6).
CONCLUSION

The First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States declares that Congress shall
make no law that abridges the freedom of the
press. This statement, taken alone, forbids
the creation of any law by Congress in regards to
the liberties that the press should be entitled
to. However, historical evidence leads one to
believe that the framers did not intend the
freedom of the press clause to be absolute. A
clear-cut explanation of this freedom's parameters has not yet been defined, but an examination
of state constitutions, debates, essays, news
articles, and court cases of the period provides
some interpretation.
As a collective group, the constitutions of
the original thirteen states suggested four elements

of the freedom of the press. First, the liberty of
the press is essential to the security and freedom
of a state and a great bulwark of society. Second, freedom of the press ought to be inviolably preserved. Third, there shall be no
restraints placed on the press. Fourth, the press
ought to be held responsible for what they print.
These four elements provide the foundation
of American thought regarding the freedom of
the press.
The foundation provided by constitutional
law was added upon by legislative debates and
opinions expressed in the period. It is unclear
that the press was in need of protection by the
federal government through its inclusion in
the Bill of Rights. Some argued that the new
constitution would trample on the press without
a guarantee of rights, while others felt that press
freedoms could not be infringed upon by a matter of principle.
The vague wording of the First Amendment led to another debate on whether the federal government had any power to regulate the
press. While few arguments support federal
power over the press, it was commonly accepted
that the states held that power, as long as the
press was not restrained. Without restraints,
punishment for printed material was used to
control the press. Individuals were tried and convicted of libel during this period, suggesting that
punishment could be given for material that was
printed. Some argue that the Alien and Sedition
Act gave the federal government power to punish
the press, but others claim that the First Amendment provided no such power.
Beyond the definition of the law, some
printers expressed the necessity of holding themselves to a higher standard. These printers advocated ethics such as objectivity, refraining from
attacking the character of an individual falsely,
and selecting material that upholds high moral
standards.
Because the evidence for this study is
rooted in opinion, concrete conclusions are difficult to clearly identifY. However, the results of
this study provide insights to what Freedom
of the Press meant by 1800. First, all individuals
had the right to speak or write about any subject
he or she wished. Second, individuals should be
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held responsible for what he or she had said or
written. Third, no prior restraints should be
placed upon the press. Fourth, states had power
to punish individuals for their written or spoken
words. Fifth, it was generally believed that the
federal government did not have power to punish individuals for their written and spoken
words, but opinions justifYing this power did
exist.
These insights are in harmony with Margaret Blanchard's studies on the freedom of the
press. Blanchard said Freedom of the Press by
1804 could be defined with six criteria, including the five points listed in the preceding paragraph (1999, 118). In addition to these five
points, Blanchard argues that individuals were
given more freedom when criticizing the government or government officials. This point cannot
be concretely substantiated by this study. However, evidence found within state constitutions
between 1776 and 1800 alludes to its validity.
The findings of this study are similar enough to
Blanchard's definition of Freedom of the Press by
1804 to support her findings.
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Only three years after the Velvet Revolution and the peacefitl fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, Czechs and
Slovaks peacefUlly parted ways on 31 December 1992. Most research has attributed Czech and Slovak nationalistic, linguistic, historical, and political diffirences to be the impetus of this separation, known as the Velvet
Divorce. This study, however, will argue that the Slovak perception ofoppression by foreigners was the major stimulus of the Velvet Divorce, evidenced by other previous Slovak autonomy movements.

On 17 November 1989, actors from
Prague theaters and political dissidents defiantly
gathered and protested against the Czechoslovak
communist regime. During the next ten days,
in what later came to be known as the Velvet
Revolution, these anti-regime protests quickly
spread from Prague's large Vaclavske namiesti to
other smaller town squares throughout the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. As the protests
spread, university students joined the movement. These protestors courageously, yet peacefully, rattled their keys, signifying their
disapproval of the oppressive policies of the
regime. Subsequently, at the end of November,
Communism officially ended in Czechoslovakia
with little or no conflict.
Following the Velvet Revolution and the
peaceful fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia,
democratic elections were held. The Czechoslovak people elected Vaclav Havel as their new
president: a playwright, political dissident, and

key player in communism's demise in Czechoslovakia. Slowly the new government instated
democratic institutions and began to privatize
state-run industries. After more than forty years
of oppressive communist dictatorship, the
Czechoslovak people had finally begun their
arduous journey to democracy.
The early nineties were a new, dynamic,
and exciting time for Czechoslovakia. The
people sought political stability amid the
Czechoslovak pursuit of democracy. Regrettably,
political stability remained elusive, and instability, caused by differences in Czech and Slovak
approaches to political and economic reform,
prevailed. Eventually, on 31 December 1992,
the Czechs and Slovaks peacefully parted ways.
This separation, known as the Velvet Divorce,
ended a relationship of over seventy years.
Few researchers have thoroughly examined the causation of the Velvet Divorce, and
they have generally limited their analyses to the
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political atmosphere of Czechoslovakia from the
Velvet Revolution to the Velvet Divorce. They
attributed Czech and Slovak nationalistic, linguistic, historical, and political differences to
be the impetus of the Velvet Divorce. Existing
research gives a partial and superficial explanation of the centrifugal force that dissolved the
Czechoslovak Federal Republic. The Slovak perception of oppression by foreigners was a major
stimulus of the Velvet Divorce; this perception is
evidenced in other Slovak autonomy movements
during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the First
Czechoslovak Republic, the Second World War,
the subsequent communist period, and the time
following the Velvet Revolution.

minor role in this great Eutopean empire. For
example, Hungarian was the lingua franca
within the Slovak realm of the Empire. The
Hungarians prohibited the use of the Slovak language and the teaching of Slovak culture and history in schools. Slovaks who refused to assimilate
could not pursue advanced education or the
careers of their choice (Leff 1997, 7). The Slovak
people had to assimilate and become Hungarian
for a modern Magyar state to become a reality.
Magyarization reaffirmed the Slovak perception
of oppression. To be Slovak was anathema. The
social and political conditions within the AustroHungarian Empire provided virtually no hope
for Slovak autonomy.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE AND

THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REpUBLIC:

MAGYAR OPPRESSION

A "PRAGOCENTRIC" REPUBLIC

In the eleventh century A.D., the Hungarian Empire was rapidly expanding as it acquired
new lands for the imperial crown. Hungarian
King Steven conquered the Slovak people, and
Slovakia was absorbed in the Hungarian Empire
(Leff 1997, 7). The Slovaks became subservient
to their oppressive Hungarian overlords. For over
nine centuries the Slovak people could not overthrow Hungarian rule. In the 1848 revolution
and later in 1861, the Slovaks pursued their program and insisted that they

World War I marked the end of great European empires and the birth of new states.
Czechoslovakia arose from the fall of the
impervious Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1918,
Tomas Garrigue Masaryk became president of
the fledgling Czechoslovak state, which consisted
of three major regions: Bohemia, Moravia, and
Slovakia. This inexperienced state was by no
means united. A lack of homogeneity in its constituent regions resulted directly from their separate histories. Bohemia and Moravia, comprising
the Czech Republic, had maintained relations
with Germanic peoples for nearly a millennium.
In contrast, Slovakia unwillingly had closer ties
with the Magyar. The ethnic composition of the
lands provides evidence of the former ties of
these regions. Researchers, studying the 1921
Czechoslovak census, have found that 22% of
Slovakia's populace were Hungarian and 31 %
of the population of the Czech Lands were
Sudeten Germans (Kucera and Pavlik 1995, 15).
Indeed, Czechoslovakia was formed from "the
debris of the Austro-Hungarian Empire" (Pehe
1992, 16). The new state was a giant conglomerate of ethnically diverse peoples: Bohemians,
Moravians, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians,
Poles, and Ruthenians.
The separate histories of the Czechs and
Slovaks did not provide for a firm foundation
upon which to build a new nation. The most

Were to be given a semi-independent state within
the framework of Hungary, i.e. Hungary was to be
federalized on the basis of nationality.... Naturally,
the Slovak demands were absolutely incompatible
with the aims of the Hungarian [rulers], which were
to transfOrm Htmgary into a modem Magyar state....
Therefore the Slovak demand for an autonomous
territory ... was rejected. (Rychlik 1995,100)

Slovak autonomy remained elusive because they
lacked the political clout within the Hungarian
Empire and the support of other powerful
nations.
In 1867 Slovakia's subservient role was validated by the Austrian Empire's formation of
a dual monarchy with the Hungarian Empire. Concomitantly, Hungarian attempts to
Magyarize the Slovak people reaffirmed their
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mmor difference between the people was the
mutually intelligible Czech and Slovak languages. However, larger differences existed. Slovaks enjoyed a more agrarian lifestyle, and
Czechs were more urbanized. Slovaks were religiously active. In contrast, a trend toward
atheism prevailed among the Czech people.
Surprisingly, these two distinct nations chose
to unite.
"The birth of Czechoslovakia ... was of
immense importance for the Czech and Slovak
nations, especially for the Slovaks ... though both
nations welcomed the new state, each had a different concept of it" (Rychlik 1995, 102). The
Slovaks envisioned a loosely united confederation of Czecho-Slovakia composed of two sovereign regions. They perceived unification to be
beneficial; relative autonomy was foreseen under
Masaryk's Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks sought to
free themselves from oppression. However, the
Czechs had a different vision. They envisioned a
unitary state governed in Prague by Czechs.
To Slovak dismay, the new state was a "Pragocentric" republic controlled by Czechs. In 1921,
the Slovak newspaper Slovensky tyUlennik wrote:
Let us not speak about a Czechoslovak nation. We
are either Czechs or Slovaks, but we cannot be
Czechoslovaks. We are citizens of a Czechoslovak
state, we have a common Czechoslovak state administration, but we are two nations. (Felak 1990, 145)

The Slovaks wanted independence. Their desire
to separate themselves from the Czechs resulted
from perceived oppression. Czech dominance
in Czechoslovakia helped "to nurture the stereotype of Slovak inferiority" (Ule 1999, 333). The
Slovaks quickly realized that a union with their
Slavic relatives reaffirmed the "inferiority" they
had previously experienced with the Magyar.
"During the two decades of the First
Republic, it became apparent that nearly everyone was dissatisfied with a unitary state of two
constituent nations and minorities-except the
Czechs" (Leff 1997, 25). The Slovak dissatisfaction with Czechoslovakia caused many Slovak
leaders, such as Monsignor Andrej Hlinka and
Father Jozef Tiso, to seek the foundation of
Slovakia as an autonomous Christian nationalist

state. The Slovaks could not tolerate another era
of oppression and "inferiority." Czechoslovakia
was not the state the Slovak nation had envisioned. Much of the Slovak intelligentsia felt that
"the Czechs were bent on eventually assimilating
the Slovak community" (Goldman 1999, 5). Just
as the Hungarians had sought to Magyarize the
Slovaks, now the Czechs sought to "Czechize"
the Slovaks. Attempted cultural assimilation
greatly fueled the fires of demand for autonomy.
SLOVAKIA: A NAZI STATE-NOMINAL AurONOMY

The occupation of the Czech Lands by
Nazi Germany beginning 6 October 1938 finally
provided Slovakia with nominal autonomy.
However, it was not until 14 March 1939 that
Slovakia, under Hitler's pressure, formally
declared her independence (Mlynirik 1993,28).
Father Tiso became Slovakia's first president.
Under Tiso's rule, Slovakia was only a Nazi puppet state run by oppression and other dictatorial
means. To ensure control of Slovakia, Hitler stationed troops in the Vah Valley near Budapest
and on the Austrian side of the Danube (Goldman 1999, 7). With Hitler watching and controlling her actions, Slovakia had not obtained
the autonomy she had sought.
Under the rule ofTiso, Slovakia followed
the mandates of Hitler. Slovakia participated in
Nazi Germany's Drang nach Osten by assisting
the Germans in their takeover of Poland. Slovak
Storm Troopers, the Hlinka Guard, were
known for stealing Jewish property (Ule 1996,
333-4). Tiso's regime deported thousands of
Jews to death camps (Mlynirik 1993, 29). Paradoxically, the Slovaks had hoped to gain autonomy, but they believed they must collude with
the Germans to attain it. However, collaboration only caused continued foreign domination
of the Slovak people. True independence was
not found in fascism. Many Slovaks realized
that the Nazi state was merely a continuation of
foreign domi-nance furthering their perception
of oppression. By 1943, anti-Tiso movements
arose throughout Slovakia (Goldman 1999, 8).
This was ultimately a third failed attempt at
autonomy.
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COMMUNISM: CZECH OPPRESSION
AND MUSCOVITE RULE

In 1945 the Allies defeated Germany and
reestablished the antebellum status quo in
Czechoslovakia, namely a Pragocentric Czechoslovak state. To the Czechs, Czechoslovakia had
never ceased to exist; conversely, to the Slovaks, a
semi-autonomous Slovakia was their perception
of reality. By 1948, the democratic Czechoslovak
government was replaced by a communist regime.
The Slovak people were generally opposed to the
Czechoslovak communist regime; it allowed for
Soviet rule and further Czech dominance.
By the early 1950s post-World War II Czechoslovakia had become a satellite of Moscow, with a Sovietstyle monolithic dictatorship committed to the
inttoduction of economic and social policies developed by Stalin in the Soviet Union .... The communist leadership in Prague acted with the apptoval of
the Kremlin. (Goldman 1999, 11-2)

Though Communism helped to alleviate many
of the tensions between the Czech and Slovak
peoples-forty years of oppressive communist
leadership forced the Slovaks, Moravians,
Czechs, and other ethnic groups of Czechoslovakia to coalesce into a fairly unified nation-the
Slovaks still had not attained the autonomy they
sought. Rather, control was switched from fascist
Berlin to communist Moscow.
Once again, the Czechs dominated the
Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
From 1948-68 Slovaks accounted for 82 of 585
appointees to the Czechoslovak corps diplomatique. Additionally, in 1968 only 3.7% of government personnel were Slovak (Goldman 1999,
12-3). Slovak interests could not be justly
addressed in such conditions of Czech dominance; the communist Czech government was
content with the status quo. Czech dominance
during Communism only perpetuated the Slovak perception of oppression.

democracy for the Czechoslovak state. Communism had ended, and the Czechoslovaks were
free again. Initially the Czechs and Slovaks
shared a common course; however, this course
markedly changed as time passed. "After the
non-Communist government took office,
Czechs and Slovaks began to disagree over political and economic issues. The disagreements
blocked the adoption of a new constitution and
slowed economic reform" (Wolchik 2001,

1214).
To the West it seemed that Czechs and Slovaks only differed economically and politically;
however, other differences existed. In fact, Slovakia's history of oppression and disputes over differences in history, language, and culture led to a
sudden resurgence in Slovak nationalism (Abercrombie 1993, 10-1; Pehe 1992, 16). Slovak
nationalism had always existed, but democracy
provided the means for the Slovaks to express
their feelings, beliefs, and political agenda. Slovaks were no longer "inferior." In 1991, the
Slovaks wrote in the Czechoslovak newspaper
Lidove noviny: "We favor a looser cooperating
confederation of two sovereign republics with
confederative principles, with sufficient advantages and sliding extent of jurisdiction" (Ule
1996, 341). A Pragocentric republic would no
longer suffice. The Slovaks insisted that their
voice be heard in the new Czechoslovak democracy. Many Czechs disagreed with the Slovak
stance, and the government reached an impasse.
In 1990-91 Slovak politicians began discussions about dissolving the Czechoslovak state.
A breakup appeared inevitable. Not all were
pleased with the Slovak politicians' choice to part
ways, so they
Initiated a campaign to have the people rather than
the politicians decide the fate of the country....
Within a month, petitions with over 2 million signatures, including 200,000 from Slovakia, were collected in support of a referendum .... Alas, as was to
be expected, the parliament could not reach a consensus on the wording of the referendum. The pub-
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lic resulted to a novel, unique way of expressing its
will in what became known as the "light-bulb refer-

The bloodless Velvet Revolution on 17
November 1989 inaugurated a new journey to

46· SIGMA

endum." At 7 :40 p.m. on November 24, 1991, those
in favor of saving Czechoslovakia switched on two

PAGE
100-watt bulbs. The sudden increase in energy
consumption registered the following unscientific
results: support for the federation in the Czech
Republic was expressed by 2.7 million households
(8.1 million population, 80 percent of the total), and
in the Slovak Republic in 450,000 households (1.35
million population, 37 percent of the total). (VIc
1996,344)

Though the "light-bulb referendum" was unofficial and unscientific, the Slovak will was made
known. The Czechs wanted unity; the Slovaks
wanted svrchovanost' (sovereign ty).
In July 1992, Slovak politicians declared
Slovakia a sovereign state free of Czech rule. The
Slovaks had finally attained svrchovanost: Czech
politicians realized that the two nations would
never again be one. The formal dissolution of
Czechoslovakia, the Velvet Divorce, occurred at
midnight on 31 December 1992. After nearly
one thousand years, the Slovaks could rule themselves. Svrchovanost~ To be Slovak was no longer
anathema; rather, Slovak citizenship was a source
of pride. The Slovaks were free from the Magyars, Germans, Soviets, and Czechs. Oppression
had ended. The Slovak nation was subject to
no one.
UNDERSTANDING THE VELVET DIVORCE

Westerners may feel inclined to question
the causation of the Velvet Divorce. After all, the
Czechs and Slovaks bear a great deal of resemblance and appear to be one people. Many Westerners may ask: Wasn't the fall of Communism
the actual cause of the Velvet Divorce? The
answer is dearly yes, but with the caveat that the
Velvet Revolution cannot be viewed as anything
more than the superficial stimulus of the Velvet
Divorce.
The Velvet Revolution opened many
unhealed wounds. Whereas some wounds
resulted from Czech-Slovak interaction, other
wounds resulted directly from Magyar-Slovak,
German-Slovak, and Russian-Slovak interaction.
The historical, linguistic, ethnic, and political
differences led to a sudden rise in Slovak nationalism and awareness of the recurring role of
oppression in Slovak history. The Slovaks

adamantly declared that they were no longer
subordinate to Czechs or any other people. The
Slovaks wanted Czecho-Slovakia (that is, a state
consisting of two equally autonomous republics), but the Czechs wanted Czechoslovakia
(namely, a Pragocentric state). The Slovak awareness of oppression contributed to the Slovak
desire to be independent. The Czech government attempted to hinder the breakup, but the
relationship was irreparable.
In the late twentieth century the former
Eastern bloc has exemplified the role of political
change in defining a region. The proverbial fall
of the Iron Curtain, which marked the dawn of
a new era of autonomy and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, was the impetus of
much modern European change. Despite the
newly acquired democratic freedoms in Europe,
few strong cohesive forces bound the region's
peoples together. Rather, balkanization, a powerfully destructive centrifugal force, prevailed. The
once powerful and ominous Soviet Union disintegrated into many new states: the Ukraine,
Belarus, and Georgia, to name a few. Many once
communist states have disappeared, forming
over a dozen new democratic states: the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia,
and others. Furthermore, Communism's demise
resulted in the end of oppressive eras. Indeed, the
pursuit of actual freedom from oppression is evidenced in the esoteric breakup of Czechoslovakia: the Velvet Divorce-Slovakia's divorcement
of her oppressive and psychologically abusive
spouse.

Steven Clark Page is a senior from Orem, Utah,
majoring in international studies. After graduation, he will pursue a joint lI1A in Czech studies
and a master ofpublic affoirs at Indiana University
at Bloomington.
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RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND THE

"No"

IN PINOCHET'S CHILE

CORREY DIVINEY

In 1988, General Pinochet, nearing the end ofhis eight-year presidential tenn, organized a new presidential election as a simple yes or no plebiscite. The surprising success of the ''No'' campaign in deposing General Pinochet
has been explained mostly through traditional social movement theory, focusing on grievances and deprivation of
the social movement participants. This study, hOUJez,er, will show that the success ofthe ''No'' campaign is instead
best explained by the application of resource mobiliz.ation theory.

The surprising success of the "No" campaign in effectively deposing General Pinochet
in the 1988 Chilean plebiscite presents an interesting anomaly for social movement scholars.
The question of how an opposition movement
that was absolutely unsuccessful in its efforts
over an almost fifteen year period was finally
able to end military rule seems at first very
puzzling. Many researchers have attempted to
explain the movement through the lens of traditional social movement theory. Such research
has focused on grievances of the politically disenfranchised Left and Center and has identified
those grievances as the underlying impetus for
the success of the campaign. While it is clear
that grievances and the deprivation of the social
movement participants played some role in the
"No" campaign, left by themselves these factors
do not adequately explain why the Chilean public was able to oust General Pinochet from office
after fifteen years of authoritarian rule. For, if

grievances and relative deprivation alone were
the dominant factors, why hadn't there been a
decisive campaign prior to 1988? More to the
point, why had prior social movements, especially those held during periods of economic crisis, failed to overturn the military regime? This
article will argue that grievances and deprivation
were not the most important factors in Chile's
return to democracy. Instead, it will be argued
that the success of the "No" campaign is best
explained by the application of resource mobilization theory. Indeed, the savvy leadership
provided by a sophisticated elite, in the form of
valuable research conducted and analyzed and
intensive campaigning based on that research,
was the most important factor in explaining the
success of the Chilean opposition in their efforts
to end military rule. In order to better understand how the social movement elite determined
the outcome of the campaign, it is important to
first understand the intricacies of the resource
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mobilization approach to social movement
theory.l
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

When the resource mobilization approach
was introduced to the scholarly dialogue on
social movement theories in the early 1970s, it
represented a radical departure from the
accepted thinking of the day. While the relative
deprivation theory, as developed and defended
by such respected social scientists as Ted Robert
Gurr, focuses heavily on the psychology of social
movement participants, resource mobilization
focuses on the resources available to a social
movement and the management of such
resources by an elite sector. The resource mobilization approach recognizes the importance of
deprivation and grievances in mobilizing a collectivity to protest. However, it suggests that
there are more important factors at play than
simply the degree of frustration of a population.
In fact, it goes so far as to suggest that there
is always enough deprivation/frustration within
a society to generate a social movement. Indeed,
resource mobilization theorists assert that even if
there is not a great degree of antipathy towards a
potential object of protest, it can be generated by
a sophisticated elite group.
In rejecting the traditional social movement explanations, resource mobilization theorists point to other factors in their attempts to
identity the most significant elements of a successful social movement. This new approach recognizes that successful social movements require
the consistent supply of resources. Time and
financial support typically constitute the bulk of
such resources. The organization and strategic
efforts essential to a successful social movement
demand the time and energy of a movement's
most politically sophisticated participants. Not
only does the leadership of a movement typically
require some type of financial support simply to
provide for its physical sustenance, but the activities of the leadership also require some degree of
financial expense. In other words, not only do
the "employees" of a social movement need a
salary to live on so that they can continue their
efforts, but they also need money to purchase
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the paper their work is printed on, they need the
technology to perform statistical analysis, they
need money to pay their phone bill, etc.
Consequently, resource mobilization
focuses heavily on the flow of resources to the
elite of a social movement. This approach seeks
to identity the external sources of support and
weighs their importance according to their donations. In order to better understand some of the
fundamental contributions of resource mobilization theory, it is useful to use a familiar example
from recent American history. In attempting an
explanation of the success of the American civil
rights movement of the 1960s, proponents of
traditional social movement theories would
point to the degree of oppression suffered by
American blacks of that period. The deprivation
of that collectivity, relative to its white counterpart, would be used to explain the widespread
protests that typified the political climate of the
American South of that time. Other theorists
would perhaps seek to explain the rise in participation in the social movement as the result of
cost/benefit analysis performed by the participants. These researchers would assert that the
decade of the 1960s was the first time in American history when protest against the white establishment would actually have been a rational act,
given the estimated costs and benefits of such
behavior. Resource mobilization theory, on the
other hand, explains the success of the Civil
Rights Movement as the result of the highly
organized and well-funded efforts of an elite few
that led activist organizations such as the SNCC,
the NAACP, CORE, and the SCLC. Instead of
focusing on the frustrated masses, resource
mobilization theorists investigate the influence
of conscience constituents. In the case of the
Civil Rights Movement, the relatively few
Northern white liberals who provided hefty
financial support for the protests are seen as
more necessary to the success of the movement
than are the tens of thousands of disenfranchised, poor Southern blacks who participated in
the marches and sit-ins. The rationale for such a
bold assertion is the belief that there had always
been a great deal of discontent within Southern
black society, but it was not until there emerged
a highly professionalized, educated, and securely
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funded social movement sector that this society
most influential in the success of the "No"
was mobilized to consistent and effective protests.
campaign, and those that this paper will focus
upon, were the social science research centers. A
A thorough discussion of the Chilean protest
few of the most influential of the Chilean
movement that culminated in the "No" would
necessarily include an in-depth treatment of
research institutes were the Center for the Study
the role of foreign donations in supporting the
of Chilean Reality (CERC), the Center for Social
movement. Given the limited scope of this artiStudies and Education (SUR), the Latin Americle, this important factor will have to be omitted.
can Faculty of the Social Sciences (FLASCO), the
Latin American Institute of Transnational Studies
Instead, this work will focus on the sophisticated
leadership of the movement and the resources,
(I LET) , the Center for Political Studies (CEP) ,
other than financial, drawn upon.
and the Center for Development Studies (CED)
As with any social science theory, the
(Puryear 1994, 131-41).
resource mobilization approach utilizes a someA social movement organization is made up
what specialized vocabulary. A thorough underof a variety of different actors, who can be classified into a few main types. An adherent is an
standing of this theory and its application to
the "No" campaign in Chile
individual or organization
requires a review of the essenIt was not until there emthat philosophically supports
tial terms of resource mobithe goals of a social moveerged a highly professionallization theory and the
ment organization. A conand
securely
ized,
educated,
unique meanings these terms
stituent is an individual or
funded social movement
have within this research parorganization who provides
adigm. To begin with, a
resources to a social movesector that society was
social movement is loosely
ment organization and can
mobilized to consistent and
defined as a collectivity uniexpect to benefit if a social
effective protests.
fied by a common preference
movement
organization
for some type of change
achieves its purposes. A
within its society. For our purposes in discussing
potential beneficiary is any individual or organithe "No" campaign we will define this movement
zation that stands to benefit if a social movement
as the shared preference to terminate the Pinochet
organization accomplishes its designs. A conpresidency. Of course, the Chilean protest movescience adherent is an individual or organization
ment also encompassed many more preferences;
that philosophically supports a social movement
some groups were pushing for a return to Socialbut stands to gain nothing (other than perhaps a
ist government, some groups were fighting for full
sense of satisfaction) from the attainment of a
accountability for human rights offenses, still
social movement organization's goals. A conother groups were fighting for democratization.
science constituent is an individual or group
thatcontributes resources to a social movement
But the only preference shared by all participants
was that Pinochet should not continue to govern
organization but stands to gain nothing if the
Chile.
social movement organization is in fact successA countermovement is a collectivity within
ful. Among the most significant conscience conthe same society unified by a common opposistituents with respect to the "No" campaign were
tion to the preferences of the social movement.
North American donor organizations. Some of
In the case we are discussing, the countermovethese organizations, such as the National
ment would be the preference shared by all those
Endowment for Democracy, actually channeled
public funds towards democratic reform in Chile
who supported Pinochet's government.
(Muravchik 1991, 209-10). Others, such as the
A social movement organization is a formal
Ford Foundation, drew upon their own resources
organization that identifies its preferences with
those of a given social movement and whose
to support the "No" (Sigmund 1993, 167). The
role of conscience constituents, such as the aforeobjective it is to achieve the goals of that social
movement. The social movement organizations
mentioned donor organizations, cannot be
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underestimated in explaining the success of the
Chilean plebiscite campaign. Again, although
these conscience constituents were an invaluable
asset to the social movement organizations that
led the plebiscite campaign, the details of their
involvement are beyond the scope of this article.
Each of these groups-the adherents, the
conscience constituents, the social movements
organizations, and so forth-played an important
role in the Chilean plebiscite. The social movement, as represented by numerous social organizations, relied upon adherents, constituents,
conscience adherents and constituents, and
potential beneficiaries in its efforts to garner
sufficient votes to force Pinochet from office.
The existence of sophisticated social movement
organizations, unified under a common purpose,
and supported by adherents and constituents, is
what distinguishes the "No" campaign from
earlier unsuccessful opposition movements in
Chile. The prominent role played by the aforementioned actors justifies the conclusion that
the resource mobilization approach is the most
effective framework in which to study the
unprecedented success of the demand for
the "No."
HISTORICAL BACKDROP

From the early 1930s until Pinochet's military coup in 1973, Chile's democratic tradition
was among the strongest in all of Latin America.
It was notable for its durability even amidst
political and economic turmoil and for its implementation of an effective and truly representative
multi-party system. The Left, Center, and Right
were all given voice in a form similar to that of
many European countries.
In 1970, Salvador Allende, the presidential
candidate for the Popular Unity (the coalition
then representing the Left), won the presidential
election with only 36% of the vote (Drake 1991,
3). The multi-party, winner-take-all electoral rules
enabled Allende to take office with a minuscule
margin of victory and a support base representing
barely more than a third of the population.
Allende's Leftist ideology, combined with his relatively small base and far-reaching agenda for social
reform, created a recipe for turmoil.
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In the midterm congressional elections of
March 1973, an alliance of the Center and Right
parties received 54% of the vote to the Popular
Unity's (UP) 44% (Roberts 1998, 88). This led
to a standoff between the executive branch and
the legislative branch. The opponents of the Up,
aided by an economy buckling under the inflation brought on by the redistributive policies of
Allende's socialist experiment, plotted a military
overthrow. On September 11, 1973, this opposition, led by General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the Allende regime. Allende refused offers
to be flown into exile and killed himself upon
the invasion of the military into the presidential
palace (Roberts 1998,91-4).
The Pinochet regime-made up of a coalition of technocrats, business elites, and most
importantly, military leadership-began an
unprecedented violation of constitutional law
and human rights in Chile. Soon after Pinochet
gained power, Congress was shut down and the
constitution abrogated (Sigmund 1993, 85, 93).
In order for the regime to survive, all outspoken
supporters of democracy had to be silenced.
Pinochet undertook this task ruthlessly and
relentlessly. Social organizations, long the bastions of democracy, were suppressed and disassembled. Those with ties to organized labor
were entirely eliminated. The armed forces tortured, killed, and exiled thousands of Chileans.
Even those, such as students and university
professors, who were traditionally protected by
cultural norms, were subject to the brutality of
this purging. Roberts documents how within six
months the military had arrested an estimated
80,000 persons, 160,000 had "suffered politically motivated job dismissals," and another estimated 200,000 people went into exile (94).
After the popular sector had been effectively
crippled, the regime turned its attentions towards
implementing neo-liberal economic reforms. Just
as the politics of Chile had undergone a transformation from democracy to authoritarianism, the
economy went from state-oriented to market
driven. Under the direction of a group of young,
American-educated technocrats known as the
"Chicago Boys," the economy experienced dramatic growth (Drake 1991, 55). The period from
1977 to 1981 became known as the "Chilean
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miracle" (Drake 1991, 253-4). However, the
miracle was not wrought without severe social
costs. Unemployment rates soared and the distribution of wealth became more disparate than
ever. This created growing resentment among
those left out of the successes of the regime, especially the already disgruntled urban working
class. The use of brutality to quell the occasional
protest continued to be a common practice
throughout this period. The Latin American debt
crisis of 1982 altered Pinochet's course drastically.
After riding on the success of the economic
reforms, the regime was severely damaged by the
recession; the GNP decreased by over 14% in
1982 alone (Sigmund 1993, 139). Pinochet's
policies of economic openness further increased
the vulnerability of the domestic economy and
intensified the effects of the recession. Thus,
ironically, the economic globalization embraced
by the regime created its first political crisis. The
widespread effects on all classes within Chilean
society created deepened disenchantment with
the Pinochet regime, even among those who had
previously supported it.
The period of 1983-86 was marked
by the nationwide protest movement that
attacked the regime's human rights violations, its
economic policies, and the legitimacy of the
regime itself. Led mostly by former labor unionists and students, the movement's most effective
form of collective action were the national days
of protest that mobilized tens of thousands,
sometimes even hundreds of thousands, of
Chileans into the public squares to defy the military regime. Other groups, such as the FPMR,
were more given to direct, violent attacks on predesignated targets. These leftist groups were also
responsible for the kidnappings and murders of
government officials and police officers.
Despite the relatively high-level of participation, this protest movement failed to
achieve its ultimate objective-the forced exit
of Pinochet from control of the Chilean government. The failure of these groups to achieve their
desired ends is fairly easy to explain. The leadership of the movement was largely made up of
uneducated workers, inexperienced students,
and illogical radicals. The dramatically different
political ideologies held by these participants and

their failure to come together to form a cohesive
force was the biggest factor in the movement's
failure. The strategies devised by groups to the
Center were far too moderate and pacifist for
those on the Left. And the terrorist actions
of those on the Left frightened many moderates
away from any form of protest whatsoever. The
Leftist violence also undermined the moderate
efforts of Centrists and gave the military regime
the justification it needed to squash the movement as a whole. Both of these groups, due to
their lack of social prestige and visibility, were
easily oppressed and even eliminated when the
regime deemed such action necessary. Their
leadership, never a bastion of efficiency, was easily rendered useless by the tactics of the military
government. Lack of organization, lack of access
to resources, and lack of sophisticated strategy
led to the eventual failure of the movement to
accomplish its ultimate goal of removing
Pinochet from office.
Ironically, however, despite the regime's
effectiveness in eventually quieting the protest
movement, the movement's exposure of the
weaknesses of the government's economic policies
did lead to a period of liberalization. Consequently, the press was allowed more openness,
and, in 1987, a law was passed allowing the reintroduction of political parties onto the national
stage (Puryear 1994, 127-8). This contradictory
environment of repression and concessions set
the stage for the "No" campaign.
THE

"No"

As part of the earlier passage of the revised
constitution put forth by the military government, the presidential term had been extended
to eight years, with no laws limiting the number
of terms (Drake 1991, 52). The President
(Pinochet) had been given the right to deem the
election a simple yes or no plebiscite and was not
expected to give more than two months notice
regarding the specific date on which the
plebiscite would occur, but one would have to
take place in 1988, that being the end of an
eight-year term. Those opposed to the Pinochet
government faced significant obstacles in
attempting to achieve a "no" vote. First of all, the
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lack of options set forth by the regime presented
nities provided by the research centers.
the opposition with no opportunity to set forth
Another function the research centers protheir own candidates. Additionally, in a country
vided was that their work contributed, through
with so many political parties and of such diverse
innovative polling techniques, a fairly accurate
political ideologies, the method of unseating
assessment of the political life of the opposition
Pinochet and the choice of a new leader could
in Chile. In the terminology of resource mobiabsolutely not be agreed upon. Unity among the
lization theory, the centers were able to deduce
opposition seemed an almost insurmountable
accurate estimates of the numbers of adherents,
task. A second obstacle was the unknown date of
constituents, and potential beneficiaries there
the plebiscite. Not being able to put a time frame
were within Chilean society. This was an invaluon their planning made effective strategizing
able tool in setting the groundwork for the
difficult. Another significant impediment to the
plebiscite. Up until this time, the only real pubopposition was the culture of fear created by
lic opinion polls based on political sentiment
fifteen years of oppressive military rule. Many
were those carried out by the military governpotential beneficiaries were hesitant to become
ment. The results of these were rarely made availpolitically active for fear of
able to the public and were
punishment by an intolerant
The conclusion drawn porof questionable accuracy.
regime if the campaign were
With
the governmental libtrayed a Chilean public that
unsuccessful. These are but a
eralization that followed the
opposed political violence,
few of the difficult problem;
economic crisis of the early
was
not
entirely
commited
the opposition faced in their
1980s, private research centers were allowed more leeefforts to unseat Pinochet.
to any single political stance
However, social movement
way in their efforts to gage
or to the exit of General
organizations, in accordance
public opinion.
Pinochet,
but
that
was
The Center for the
with resource mobilization
Study of Contemporary
theory, were able to overalmost uniformly supportive
Reality (CERC), a Santiago
come these obstacles.
of democratic principles.
based research facility, was
Political parties were
among the first and most
banned under Pinochet until
important of the many centers that effectively
1987. The many social science research centers
became social movement organizations working
in Chile took the place of the parties as the centowards democratic change in Chile. CERC
ters of political thought and activity in the years
researchers began holding workshops to discuss
prior to the plebiscite. As the centers were prithe prospects for carrying out public opinion
vately funded, somewhat less conspicuous than
studies in Chile in the mid-1980s. These workthe universities, and without the overtly political
shops came to include international public opinintentions held by the parties, the research cenion experts who had conducted influential survey
ters never became the target of government cenresearch during democratic transitions of other
sorship. These centers were essential to the
nations, such as that of Spain in 1975. Following
survival of the opposition in that they simply
the lead of social research organization Diagnos,
provided employment for the many politically
whose general, nonpolitical survey work had
minded intellectuals who would usher in the
showed the public as responsive to polls of this
democratic transition. The suffering economy
nature, CERC began to conduct surveys. Unlike
and the censorship of university life would surely
Diagnos, however, the purely academically motihave encouraged these elites to seek employment
vated surveys were politically slanted. As the
in American or European universities. As many
results increasingly suggested that Chileans
of these academicians had already received docwould indeed respond to political surveys, the
torate degrees from prestigious foreign universiresearchers became bolder in their efforts to
ties, life as expatriates would have been the most
understand the political climate of Chile under
sensible option, had it not been for the opportu-
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Pinochet. In 1987, the CERC researchers conducted the first nationwide survey of political
attitudes since the coup (Puryear 1994, 134-8).
Another research center whose work had
invaluable implications to the opposition movement was the Latin American Faculty of the
Social Sciences (FLACSO). Like CERC,
FLACSO's early surveys began as contract work
for private entities. In one of these early surveys,
prepared in Spain for the Spanish government in
order to determine Chilean public opinion concerning that country, FLACSO researchers,
apparently more out of curiosity than any real
political designs, decided to throw in a few politically slanted questions. The test was to determine whether the Chilean public would respond
to inquiries as to their political leanings. The
regime had been so intolerant of political expression that many researchers operated under the
assumption that Chileans would be reluctant to
commit their positions to paper. When this
proved not to be the case, FLACSO researchers,
again out of academic interest, began to develop
more direct surveys. In the years leading up to
the 1988 plebiscite, FLACSO's surveys helped
to dispel many of the false notions previously
held by the opposition elite, and the center
emerged as one of the opposition's most powerful social movement organizations (Puryear

1994, 134-8).
The work of CERC, FLACSO, and other
research centers like them, constituted a turning
point for the opposition movement. Throughout
the years of military rule, would-be political
leaders had made unfounded and conflicting
claims concerning the "will of the people." For
the communists, the "will of the people" was, of
course, communism, for the socialists, socialism,
and so on. The availability of the hard empirical
data provided by the surveys forced adherents of
various ideologies to confront the indisputable
facts. What they found was both surprising and
encouragmg.
One of the most enlightening findings was
that the Chilean public generally held much
more moderate views than had previously been
supposed. The popular belief prior to the surveys, especially among the Left, was that the
Chilean public espoused fairly radical political

beliefs and was supportive of a violent overthrow
of the military regime. The strategy of social
mobilization that had characterized the opposition movement since the early days of the coup
reflected this ideology of change by force. This
belief was probably supported by the fact that
the most visible, if not the only visible, political activists were involved in radical, violent
political activities. Guerrilla groups such as the
MIR and the FPMR had left a long legacy of
political violence on the streets of Chile. Due to
the intimidating oppression of the Pinochet
regime, these groups were really the only actively
engaged protesters for many of the years of military rule. It was therefore only natural for the
elites to assume that the actions of the few represented the sentiment of the many. However, the
surveys revealed that in fact very few Chileans
supported a popular overthrow. While the surveys did prove that the majority favored a political transition, this support was contingent upon
it being enacted peacefully. This new revelation
forced a paradigmatic shift for many of the elites
at the helm of the social movement (Puryear

1994, 137).
Another important discovery of these surveys was that Pinochet's support among the
Chilean public had been underestimated by
the opposition's elites. Whereas before, the opposition had subscribed to the belief that the vast
majority of Chileans (excluding the wealthy capitalists) were strongly opposed to the military
government, the opposition leadership was now
forced to confront the finding that roughly onethird of the population were either constituents
or adherents of the countermovement that the
Pinochet government represented. The surveys
also indicated that another one-third of the population were neither constituents nor adherents of
either side. This helped the opposition leadership realize that a substantial recruiting effort
would be required if these potential beneficiaries
were to be converted to the movement to end
Pinochet's presidency. The sobering nature of
these facts forced opposition leadership to come
to terms with their unfounded hubris and to
realize that a transition to democracy would not
come as easily as they had previously believed.
On the positive side, by knowing its limitations
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and those of its enemy, the opposition was better prepared to confront the obstacles ahead
(Puryear 1994, 137).
Perhaps the most encouraging discovery of
the surveys was that the vast majority of the
Chilean public greatly valued democratic principles. In spite of almost a decade and a half of
authoritarian rule, political parties remained a
much-desired commodity. Chileans still identified themselves with various democratically oriented ideals and were supportive of a return to
thoroughly democratic governance. The conclusion drawn from these results portrayed a
Chilean public that opposed political violence,
was not entirely committed to any single political stance or to the exit of General Pinochet, but
that was almost uniformly supportive of democratic principles (Puryear 1994,137).
The research centers continued to be of
great importance to the opposition elites as they
began to reevaluate past approaches and to devise
new strategies for democratization. When the
CIS consortium was formed midway through
1987 by three academic research centers (CEO,
ILET, & SUR), it represented a more overtly and
deliberately political approach to the research
that had been performed by centers like
FLASCO and CERe. The CIS consortium had
as its mission the transformation of research findings into sophisticated political strategy and
modern campaign techniques. With the donated
assistance of the Sawyer/Miller group, an American political consulting firm, CIS was able to
make insightful recommendations to the opposition political parties that had been recently
organized or reorganized. Among the principal
members of CIS were intellectuals who were also
participating in a group known as the Technical
Committee for Free Elections. The primary purpose of the committee was to offer strategic
advice to the political parties pushing for free
elections. After a comprehensive review of the
important survey findings the committee realized
the fundamental inapplicability of social mobilization to the Chilean situation. The realization
that the public was opposed to tumultuous politics, cynical of new initiatives, weary of conventional forms of protests, and fearful of the
uncertainty of the future convinced the commit-
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tee to abandon the initiatives for free elections. It
was concluded that the most successful effort
would be an intense and comprehensive campaign to vote "no" in the upcoming plebiscite.
This new approach would manage the cynicism
and apathy prevalent among Chilean citizens by
simplifYing the campaign and by generating an
optimistic, even fraternal, sense of unity among
the various political factions. By just saying no
the populace would not be overwhelmed by the
complexities that had characterized the opposition programs up to that point. By unifYing the
cause the opposition would be playing upon a
perceived need in Chilean society to finally come
together in healing a countty fragmented by
years of political violence. Additionally, by abandoning the contentious demand for free elections, the opposition would be appeasing a
public already frightened by political conflict of
any kind (Puryear 1994, 138-42).
After having solidified their position, these
academics began an intensive effort to convince
the nonacademic political elites of the wisdom of
their stance. This would not be an easy task. The
position of these opposition political leaders, the
bulk of which formed the leadership of the
newly formed parties, had been that participation in the plebiscite was out of the question.
Most felt that the plebiscite of 1980 had been
corrupt and that the regime would again somehow ensure itself a victory. Leaders believed that
participation in the plebiscite would undermine
the position of the opposition movementPinochet was bound to win in any case, and
their participation would allow him the leverage
of claiming that he had been democratically
elected. Instead, they believed that, through
effective social mobilization, the opposition
movement could demand free elections, with
each political party presenting its candidate.
Through a series of weekly meetings conducted
by academics from CIS and from the Technical
Committee, these once dogmatic leaders were
subjected to facts that forced them to reevaluate
their previously incontestable assumptions.
These meetings, consisting of chat groups, dinner parties, and even campaign strategy classes,
were focused on dispelling the popular notions
regarding public opinion and in convincing the
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social movement organization leadership that
given an apathetic and frightened Chilean public, a bold campaign for free elections was an
untealistic strategy (Puryear 1994, 145). The
Pinochet government would hold the plebiscite,
with or without the approval of the opposition.
The constituents, adherents, and potential beneficiaries of the opposition movement would be
caught unprepared and without voter registration cards and Pinochet would win the
plebiscite, remaining in office for at least another
eight years. Given those odds, the regime would
not even need a rigged election to ensure victory.
After several months of this dialogue, the opposition elites were eventually won over to the
strategy of participation in the plebiscite and in
simply unifYing to vote Pinochet out of office.
In February of 1988, thirteen political parties
formed the "Concertacion para el No," a coalition reflecting this new approach (Roberts 1998,

128-9).
The Technical Committee was asked by
the coalition, which eventually consisted of sixteen parties, to conduct the plebiscite campaign.
Drawing from the survey findings, the committee built a campaign characterized by its appeal
to previously uncommitted Chileans and by its
optimistic, forward-looking approach. Having
discovered that the percentage of Pinochet supporters who were registered voters was significantly higher than all other segments of the
population, the committee undertook a comprehensive effort to register all social movement
constituents, adherents, and potential beneficiaries. The groups identified as being especially disengaged from the electoral system, such as urban
youth, were the targets of registration efforts that
had been tailored to appeal to such groups. The
result of these efforts was a drastic increase in
voter registration rates among those opposed to
the Pinochet government.
The way in which the social movement
elites framed the message of the campaign also
had substantial effects on the outcome of the
plebiscite. As a majority of the Chilean population was shown to have been cynical of all things
political, the campaign was designed as a promise of good feelings upon Pinochet's exit from
government. The campaign slogan became "La

Alegria Ya Viene." The fifteen-minute infomercials aired each night consisted of themes of
unity, peace, order, and happiness. Subsequent
surveys demonstrated a marked preference for
the media campaigns of the opposition over that
of the regime (Sigmund 1993, 172-4).
The sophisticated strategy of the social
movement elites, as embodied by the research
center academics and newly converted political
party leaders, led to a victory in the plebiscite
held on October 5, 1988. The opposition won
with almost 55% of the vote, forcing Pinochet
from office and reintroducing democracy to
Chile (Sigmund 1993, 175-6). Three months
later Patricio Aylwin, leader of the Christian
Democratic Party, was chosen as president
in a free and fair election (Sigmund 1993,

183-7).
While it is clear that the deprivation and
grievances of the Chilean public played a significant role in the success of the plebiscite, as
manifested by voter turnouts and simply by a
victorious outcome, their efforts in achieving
that success was marginal when compared with
the role of the social movement organizations
and the elites that were leading them. The function of the research institutions was especially
crucial. The research centers provided a home
base, so to speak, to the sophisticated elites
whose informed strategy provided the thrust
of the plebiscite campaign. The significance of
these research institutions in producing a dialogue among the different factions within the
movement and in creating a single approach
is especially evident when compared with the
earlier failures of the Chilean social movements.
The work that was done in conducting informative surveys, developing the basic strategy
of the campaign, registering previously uncommitted voters, and winning over potential beneficiaries was the indispensable element in
achieving a return to democratic governance
in Chile.

Correy Diviney is a graduate student from
Crestview, Florida. His plans include continuing
work in Washington, D. c., before attending
law school.
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BOOK REVIEW: JIHAD VS. MCWORLD

AND DEMOCRACY

FRED DONALDSON

JIHAD VS.

Me WORLD: How

GLOBALISM AND

TRIBALISM

ARE

RESHAPING THE WORLD.

Benjamin R. Barber, New York: Ballantine Books, 1996. 389pp.

The cover of the book Jihad vs. Me World,
by Benjamin Barber, shows a veiled Muslim
woman holding a can of Pepsi. This photograph
illustrates the stark contrast between two simultaneous and very active global forces: Jihad, or
tribalism, and McWorld, or economic globalization. Barber successfully shows the occurrence
of McWorld and Jihad through the use of
examples, statistics, and observations. Barber
explains that Jihad is a backlash against
McWorld and explores, in the pages of this
book, the interactions between these two global
processes.
Barber uses automobile manufacturing
and anecdotal statistics to describe McWorld,
which represents economic globalization. He
notes that in the new global economy it has
become difficult to trace automobile genealogy.
For example, labels required by a 1994 U.S. law
reveal that Chrysler Corporation's Dodge
Stealth is manufactured in Nagoya, Japan, while
the Mitsubishi Eclipse is produced in Normal,

Illinois (25). Through the process of economic
globalization, "American" cars can be built in
Japan, while "Japanese" cars are built in America. Anecdotal statistics, cited by Barber, bolster
his evidence regarding the occurrence of
McWorld. McDonald's restaurants serve 20 million customers around the world every day,
which is more than the people in Greece, ireland, and Switzerland combined. Furthermore,
the $2.4 billion's worth of pizzas sold in 1991 by
Domino's alone was enough to fund the collective government expenditures of Senegal,
Uganda, Bolivia, and Iceland (24). These figures
show the power and size of some of today's
multinational corporations.
According to Barber, McWorld undermines democracy because it advocates business
interests that conflict with state goals, increases
interdependency, and disconnects citizens from
public matters. Barber posits that McWorld does
not recognize full employment as a public good.
Business efficiency leads to capital-intensive
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production, resulting in labor-minimizing job
policies. For example, technological innovations
and developments of new farm machinery have
changed the nature of American agriculture.
Though still a dominant world producer, America now employs just 2% of the workforce to
grow crops, compared to 80% previously (27).
Barber also believes that at the same time
that McWorld increases global interdependency,
it threatens democracy by moving nations
away from self-sufficiency. Barber shows the existence of global interdependency by analyzing
U.S. reliance on foreign oil and arguing that
most countries import a large amount of the
mineral, agricultural, and other resources they
use (35).
McWorld damages democracy by causing
citizens to lose interest in public affairs.
Uncomfortable with what they see in a selfabsorbed private sector and an unsympathetic
government, consumption-weary people find
themselves politically alienated (280). This
problem is rooted in the way McWorld views
people: citizens are nothing more than consumers. The economy, rather than democratic
participation, controls policy. Without citizens,
democracy is impossible. McWorld, rather than
pursuing equality and justice, entertains a
"bloodless economics of profit" (8). Citing
Robert Putman, Barber states, "when people
start bowling alone instead of together in
leagues this [is a sign of] trouble for democracy" (275). The resulting lack of citizenship
weakens the community institutions on which
a civil society must rest.
The second section of the book discusses
Jihad. Barber states that even while McWorid is
bringing the world closer together through
economic connections, Jihad is fragmenting
it through tribalism. Jihad manifests itself in
many forms: from provincialism, parochialism,
and religious struggle to bloody wars on behalf
of partisan identity and resistance to modernity.
Barber uses the term Jihad to suggest extreme
dogmatic devotion applied to any group,
whether religious, political, or ethnic. Jihad
identifies the self by contrasting it with an alien
"other" and makes politics an exercise in exclusion and resentment.
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A diluted version of Jihad can be seen in a
tendency to resist modernity in Western Europe.
"Provincialism, which sets the periphery against
the center, and parochialism, which disdains the
cosmopolitan ... are hostile to the capital city and
all it stands for." Small-town citizens are less
threatened by decentralized power; they embrace
the concept of town or ward government. By this
reasoning, residents of Barcelona or Lyon feel
freer than those of Madrid or Paris and so on.
Parochialism objects to cosmopolitanism and
commercialism, forces that corrupt human association. Shying away from modernity, supporters
of Jihad bunker-up in local communities, seeking a return to tradition and ways of the past

(169-70).
Barber believes that Jihad is at war with
McWorid. An example of this war can be seen in
the criticism offered by Hasan al-Banna, the
founder of the Islamic group known as the Muslim Brotherhood. AI-Banna criticized Westerners
for "importing their half-naked women into
these regions, together with their liquors, their
theaters, their dance halls, their amusement,
their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their
whims, their silly games, and their vices." Barber
notes that al-Banna believed that the culture of
the West was "more dangerous than political and
military campaigns" (210). This quote and other
examples are used as evidence that Jihad is a
backlash against McWorid.
In Barber's opinion, the Christian Right's
campaign for a return to family values is an
American example of Jihad. The American Jihad
exists in the Protestants who rebel against the
culture generated by McWorid in their midst. In
this McWorld, despised "liberal" politicians
undermine their belief systems with textbooks
that preach evolution and schools that bar prayer
(212).
Barber states that although Jihad and
McWorid are opposing forces, they can be
observed in the same country at the same
instant. "Iranian zealots keep one ear tuned to
the mullahs urging holy war and the other
cocked to Rupert Murdoch's Star television
beaming in Dynasty, Donahue, and The Simpsons from hovering satellites" (4-5). Other
examples include fundamentalists in the United
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States plotting virtual conspiracies over the Internet and the Russian Orthodox Church teaming
up with California businessmen to bottle and
sell natural waters blessed by Patriarch Aleksy II.
Barber argues that Jihad is detrimental to
democracy within the country where it manifests
itself because it destroys the mind-set that allows
democracy to function. Jihad's demand for
extreme devotion also limits its access to real
power in a centralized independent world.
Although tribes and religious clans have democratic possibilities, Jihad does not lead to the
democratic values and institutions of the nationstates they fragment (233). His assertions are
confirmed by historical facts, such as the military
coup that ousted the formerly democratic government in Pakistan.
While Barber shows that Jihad is detrimental to democracy, his conclusions about the negative impact of globalization on democracy are
debatable. Barber himself admits that economic
freedom eventually leads to democracy. In a
regrettable choice of examples, he uses the former Soviet Union to show that economic freedom leads to democracy in a very slow and
unpredictable way. But Perestroika, an economic
reform policy, was only enacted in the mid1980s, and it quickly became the catalyst for the
dismantling of the totalitarian state in the early
1990s. Other countries that have successfully
transitioned to democracy from totalitarianism
through economic programs include South
Korea, Chile, and Hungary.
Barber's claim that McWorld harms
democracy by decreasing citizen participation in
public affairs is also questionable. Economic
globalization has unintended positive effects
on democracy. In some respects, the Internet
and other innovations resulting from economic

globalization actually facilitate CIVIC partICIpation, thus bolstering democracy. The amount of
information available at the touch of a button for
individual consumption and analysis is staggering. Economic globalization often increases civic
participation by creating a more-involved and
better-informed citizenry. This in turn results in
greater government accountability and improved
democratic processes.
In the last chapter of the book, Barber
offers a radical solution to the problem of eroding global democracy caused by Jihad and
McWorld: the establishment of a global confederation with a single civil society. This organization would resemble the loose unit set up by
the original American colonies in the Articles
of Confederation. Such a confederation would
allow current nation-states to "create, bottomup, a global association" (289). According to
Barber, this new organization would offer a starting place to defend against the depredations of
both Jihad and McWorld.
Barber's failure to consider economic prosperity, a result of globalization, more desirable
than a strong civil society and his advocacy of an
idealistic world confederacy show the reader his
political paradigm. Barber advocates increased
democracy on a global scale as opposed to
increased localized democracy. For Barber, it is
global democracy alone that can bring together a
planet torn apart by the opposing forces of Jihad
and McWorld.
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